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A PLACE FOR WALTER CLARK IN THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION
WILLIS P. WHICHARDt
Walter Clark, Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court
from 1903 to 1924, is a preeminent figure in North Carolina jurispru-
dence. A forerunner in many ways, Clark was an early advocate for
such causes as women's suffrage and child labor laws. In this Article
Judge Whichard reviews the evidence on Clark'sjudicial and personal
life, and evaluates earlier biographical treatment of Clark. Although
Clark died over sixty years ago, there still is no consensus on the merits
of his contributions. Clark's stature as one of the most influential
judges in the history of the State and the Nation, however, is
undeniable.
A hemlock shades an inconspicuous grave in Raleigh's Oakwood Ceme-
tary. The marker reads:
WALTER CLARK
CHIEF JUSTICE
BORN 19 AUGUST 1846
DIED 19 MAY 19241
t Associate Judge, North Carolina Court of Appeals. A.B. 1962, J.D. 1965, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill; LL.M. 1984, University of Virginia.
The author is indebted to Walter F. Pratt, Associate Professor of Law at Duke University, for
suggesting Walter Clark as a subject; to E. Elizabeth Lefler, Tracy K. Lischer, Susan F. Owens,
Daniel F. Read, and P. Michelle Rippon, for their support and assistance during this endeavor;,
and to G. Edward White, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, for helpful suggestions
and advice. He also is indebted to his subject, Walter Clark, for proving unfailingly interesting
company during several months of research and writing.
1. The graves of several other notable jurists and statesmen also are located in Oakwood
Cemetery; for the most part, these graves are considerably more ornate than Clark's grave. A few
steps away from Clark's marker, a large monument decorates the grave of Josephus Daniels--
editor, confidant of President Woodrow Wilson, Secretary of the Navy, Ambassador to Mexico,
and honorary pallbearer for Clark. The News and Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina), May 21,
1924, at 1, col.2, at 14, col.2; see also A. BROOKS, WALTER CLARK: FIGHTING JUDGE 53 (1944)
(discussing the friendship between Clark and Daniels); I THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK 190,
224-25 (A. Brooks & H. Lefler eds. 1948). Tall, ornate stones mark the graves of Governors
Jonathan Worth (1865-68) and Daniel G. Fowle (1884-91). Governors Aycock (1901-05), Bragg
(1855-59), Holden (1865, 1868-70), and Swain (1832-35) also lie here.
Two other chief justices of the Supreme Court of North Carolina are buried in Oakwood
Cemetery: John L. Taylor, the first chief justice (1819-29), and Richmond M. Pearson (1859-78),
who led the court in the Civil War and Reconstruction eras. Pearson's monument contains exten-
sive writing, including the words, "his epitaph is written by his own hand in the North Carolina
Reports." Walter Clark said of Pearson: "He was the equal of Ruffin, if not his superior, as a
common law lawyer. He had probably more originality, and, as far as he went, was as accurate
.... " I THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra, at 549. "Few will deny Ruffin's rank as our
greatest judge. None will deny Pearson's claim to the second place, except those who claim for
him the first." Id., quoted in J. Hutchens, The Chief-Justiceship and the Public Career of Rich-
mond M. Pearson, 1861-1871, at 138 (1960) (unpublished master's thesis, University of North
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Although the message is simple2 and the grave obscure, the person described
was neither of these. He was, instead, a judicial harbinger, who was contro-
versial in life and has remained so posthumously.
G. Edward White in his book The American Judicial Tradition,3 profiles
certain American judges, chosen on the basis of historical interest, and availa-
bility of information.4 Only judges no longer serving on the bench were con-
sidered. Although Clark is not included, 5 he satisfies White's criteria. First,
his juridical service ended over sixty years ago. Second, his life is of historical
interest in that it "reflect[s] the governing social and intellectual assumptions
of [a period] in American history .... -6 Last, although history is only "the
recorded part of the remembered part of the observed part of what hap-
pened,"'7 and regrettable gaps exist in the record of Clark's life,8 there is ade-
quate information from which to draw Clark's profile. The premise of this
Article is that Clark merits the consideration that White has accorded to other
American judges; its purpose is to supplement The American Judicial Tradition
with a profile of Walter Clark.
I. LINEAGE
Biographers commonly seek clues to the character and personality of their
subjects in the disposition and influence of their ancestors. 9 Clark's ancestors,
however, provide no ready explanation of his character and personality. 10 The
Carolina at Chapel Hill) (available in the North Carolina Supreme Court Library, Raleigh, North
Carolina).
Unless otherwise indicated, dates during which people served in their respective offices have
been taken from NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF SECRETARY OF STATE, NORTH CAROLINA GOVERN-
MENT 1585-1974: A NARRATIVE AND STATISTICAL HISTORY (J. Chaney ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT].
2. Clark wanted only a simple marker. A year before his death, Clark and his son walked
through the cemetery and noted the elaborate monuments. He told his son, "When my days are
over, I wish a simple marker placed over my grave. Whatever services I may have rendered to my
countrymen during life will be cherished by them when I am gone. This is the only monument I
care for." A. BROOKS, supra note I, at 253.
3. G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION (1976).
4. Id at 2-3.
5. White notes that "[a] work that presents a broad sweep of history through profiles of
individuals necessarily presents problems of inclusion and exclusion." Id at 2.
6. Id at4.
7. Address by Dr. George V. Taylor, Professor of History at the University of North Caro-
lina at Chapel Hill, to the University community (Feb. 8, 1960).
8. Although Clark saved a substantial amount of his papers, there are large, unexplained
gaps. The papers are sparse, for example, for the periods 1879-92 and 1921-24.
The North Carolina State Archives, located in the State Library Building in Raleigh, North
Carolina, contains numerous boxes of Clark's correspondence. There also are many collections
that contain letters from Clark to others. Further, some of Clark's papers are at the libraries of the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Duke University. The author found very few
significant materials in Clark's papers not included in I THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra
note 1, and 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK (A. Brooks & H. Lefler eds. 1950).
9. See, e.g., R. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 3 (1982).
Caro concluded that "to understand Lyndon Johnson it is necessary to understand the Bunton
strain [(ie., Johnson's maternal line)], and to understand what happened to it when it was mixed
with the Johnson strain .... " Id
10. The information on Clark's ancestors in the text is from A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 23-
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evidence reveals nothing in his family background that presaged juridical
greatness. On the other hand, none of his more immediate ancestors require
apology.
Clark's great-grandfather, Colin Clark, came to the United States from
Scotland in the mid-eighteenth century. He married Janet McKenzie, a cler-
gyman's daughter, and they named their oldest son David." David demon-
strated an unusual capacity for business, and accumulated an estate quite large
for his time. At age thirty-four he married Louise Norfleet, whose father gave
her a hundred slaves and several thousand acres of land along the Roanoke
River in eastern North Carolina. David's frugality and business judgment
augmented the merged family fortunes so that he became one of the most
wealthy and successful planters in North Carolina.
The union of David Clark and Louise Norfleet produced eleven children,
the eighth of whom they named David Clark II. He married Anna Maria
Thorne, who was educated in New York and whose grandfather was a distin-
guished New York physician. Their first child, born August 19, 1846, was
named Walter McKenzie Clark.
II. CHILDHOOD
In addition to ancestral clues to character and personality, biographers
commonly seek to discover events that may have influenced their subjects dur-
ing youth.' 2 Although it would be hyperbole to conclude that one must un-
derstand Clark's ancestral strains to comprehend Clark himself, it is fair to
infer that those strains profoundly influenced his childhood and his adult life.
Clark's ancestors, for their time at least, were educated, talented, and econom-
ically successful. Their economic and educational wealth led to a childhood
for Clark that was financially secure and could be devoted substantially to
learning. While most eastern North Carolina children during the mid-nine-
teenth century tilled fields, Clark read books. 13 When he was eleven years old,
one of his teachers wrote to his father: "He is very studious and, what is rather
remarkable in a boy of his age, seems to be so from the love of study. If I had
26. The author also has consulted an extensive geneological chart and other Clark family materi-
als supplied by Walter Clark, great-grandnephew of Chief Justice Clark.
11. "David" and "Walter" are common names in the Clark family. Three bearers of the
names presently work in the North Carolina legal community. David Clark, grandson of the chief
justice, is a Lincolnton attorney engaged primarily in nonlegal activities. A second David Clark, a
grandnephew, is a practicing attorney in Greensboro. Walter Clark, a great-grandnephew, is an
ocean and coastal law specialist with the University of North Carolina Sea Grant College Pro-
gram at North Carolina State University in Raleigh.
12. See, e.g., J. COOPER, JR., WALTER HINES PAGE: THE SOUTHERNER As AMERICAN 1855-
1918, at 3-4 (1977). Cooper believed that a youthful Walter Hines Page was influenced pro-
foundly by having seen coffins of deceased Civil War soldiers unloaded from trains. Id.
13. See Note, Walter Clark, 2 N.C.L. REv. 225, 226 (1924) (indicating that Clark's father
had a large private library). Clark apparently used his father's library extensively. He is said to
have shown an early interest in reading as a child. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note
1, at 3. By the time he entered military school at age fourteen, he evinced "a strong and active
mind" and "had already learned how to study and ... to make books his companions." A.
BROOKS, supra note 1, at 1. While at military school he "frequently asked that books be sent
him," presumably from his father's library. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 5.
1985]
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a school of such boys, most of the troublesome part of the business would be
avoided."' 14 Two years later Clark made the highest possible grade in every
subject except speaking. These grades were prophetic; Clark never became a
great platform orator.'
5
Clark was a vigorous and longtime advocate of equal legal rights for wo-
men. Perhaps it is overly simplistic to attribute that focus to the influence of
his mother; evidence, however, strongly supports such an attribution. Corre-
spondence between the youthful Clark and his mother reveals a close relation-
ship. 16 She appears to have been a knowledgeable woman who strongly
encouraged learning, and a deeply religious person who inculcated zeal in her
progeny.
At age twelve Clark wrote to his mother: "I read three chapters in my
Bible regularly every day and five or ten every Sunday like you requested me
to do; I go to Sunday School and Church .... -17 When he was fourteen his
mother wrote:
There is one thing I wish to admonish you on & that is the subject of
prayer & reading your bible, never neglect getting on your knees, in
humble submission, to your Maker, before you retire to rest, (never
mind who is in the room) & read your bible every day, let others
scoff if they will, but never, do you swerve from your duty to your
God, remember, to him we owe our all, & on him are dependent for
everything-You must try and set a good example for others & not
be led off by wild & wicked boys-You know the promises in the
bible to those who heed the instructions of their Parents .... Is
That same letter encouraged Clark to "go regularly to the Methodist church"
and to hear a certain minister.19 Perhaps the tenacity with which Clark pur-
sued the causes he advocated as an adult is attributable to the religious zeal
implanted in him by his mother.
Other letters from Clark to his mother disclose early interest in juridical
matters. At age fourteen he wrote: "Tell Pa the '"Life & Times" of Judge
Iredell' in cloth costs $5.00 in sheep $6.00. Is he willing for me to get it at that
price; The one I allude to is by Griffith J. McRee who married Judge Iredell's
14. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 31.
15. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note i, at 4; see also Winston, Book Review, 22
N.C.L. REv. 181 (1944). Winston states:
[Clark] became. . . a pungent, cryptic, powerful writer, though no speaker. The grand
passion of the orator, the rolling periods, the deep, soul-stirring voice, that matchless
something called "action" by Demosthenes, all these accessories Clark lacked. In private
conversation he was soft spoken, affable and natural; but on his feet he was exactly the
opposite: affected, unnatural, his shoulders squared, his voice militaristic, imperative,
though not loud. As a public speaker he labored and seemed to bite his words.
Id. at 184. For information on Winston, see infra note 89 and text accompanying notes 89-100.
16. See generally I THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note I, for the numerous letters
exchanged between Clark and his mother that support this conclusion.
17. Id at 8-9.




grand-daughter, is he the one Pa spoke of."' 20 Ten days later he wrote: "I sent a
$10 bill to Pomeroy and he sent me 'Life and Correspondence of Judge Iredell'
neatly bound in 2 vol cloth-and 'Plutarch's Lives' in 4 vol ca/together with
$1.25 over, you know I have a long time wished to get the latter books
"21
James Iredell was the first and one of only two North Carolinians to serve
on the United States Supreme Court.22 Clark's early interest in Iredell is par-
ticularly significant given that Clark himself subsequently was considered for
appointment to the Court. In 1914 the North Carolina congressional delega-
tion urged President Woodrow Wilson to appoint Clark; instead Wilson ap-
pointed John H. Clarke of Ohio. Harlan Fiske Stone, while Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, recalled that at that time he was Dean of the Columbia
Law School, and that members of his faculty had observed that the President
had appointed the wrong Clark.
23
III. MILITARY SERVICE, HIGHER EDUCATION, PRACTICE OF LAW
At age fifteen Clark entered the Confederate Army. 24 Despite his youth,
he immediately became second lieutenant and drill master. He ultimately
reached the rank of major and fought in many battles, one of which-Antie-
tam-involved another future jurist of considerable note, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.
In February 1863 Clark resigned his commission to complete his educa-
tion. In the spring he entered the University of North Carolina, from which
he graduated in one year with the first honors in his class.2 5
Little is known about Clark's legal education. On August 20, 1863, he
wrote to his father from Chapel Hill and noted that he had commenced read-
ing law under Judge William H. Battle, then Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina:
Next June (if I should continue here that long) if I pass well upon
what I recite to [Judge Battle] I will be entitled to a County Court
License tho' I would not be entitled to plead until I am 21. I have no
idea whatever of being a lawyer but as you wished me to have a com-
plete education I thought that would benefit me some in after life at
least as much as the Greek which I have bestowed so much time on
& which I am studying to make up.
2 6
Apparently Blackstone was a staple of legal education at that time, for the
same letter states: "If there is a 'Blackstone's Commentaries' in the neighbor-
20. Id at 27.
21. Id. at 32.
22. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, supra note 1, at 751, 756. Iredell served on the
Supreme Court from 1790 to 1799. The other was Alfred Moore (1799-1804). Id.
23. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 190-91.
24. See id. at 3-22. See generally 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 49-141
(discussing Clark's military career).
25. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 14-15.
26. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 109.
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hood please send it to me ... as the one I am using is Judge Battle's. 27
After completing his studies under Judge Battle and serving in the Con-
federate Army for the duration of the Civil War, Clark still was not twenty-
one years old. Because he was ineligible to practice law in the county courts,
he decided to go to New York City to pursue further legal studies. Finding no
law school open there, he began the study of law at the offices of Weeks and
Foster, 58 Wall Street. He later went to the Columbian Law School in Wash-
ington, D.C., and completed its law course in a few months.
28
There also is relatively little information known about Clark's career as a
practicing attorney. It was rather remarkable, however, for one who "ha[d] no
idea whatever of being a lawyer."'29 Clark's diaries record his "first argument
in a Law Case" as "senior counsel for the plaintiff in the Moot Court" on
December 5, 1866.30 They also record his receipt of a county court license in
Raleigh on January 14, 1867, and the refusal on the same date, because of his
age, to "let [him] stand" for his superior court license.
31
Exactly one year later Clark received his superior court license and began
appearing in that court in his native Halifax County.32 He also appeared sev-
eral times before the Supreme Court of North Carolina, on which he subse-
quently served for thirty-five years. During one term Clark argued two cases
of his own and three for other lawyers. Older practitioners often employed
him to argue their cases before the supreme court.33
Clark moved from his native Halifax County to the capital city of Raleigh
in late 1873.34 He did so partly because he was employed as director and
general counsel for North Carolina of the Raleigh and Gaston and the Ra-
leigh and Augusta railroads.35 His fiancee, Susan Washington Graham-
daughter of William A. Graham, formerly Governor, United States Senator,
Secretary of the Navy,36 and Whig Candidate for Vice President37-also pre-
ferred Raleigh as a home.
38
From that time until his appointment as a judge of the superior court in
April 1885, Clark conducted an exacting law practice. He represented some
wealthy corporate interests, including the railroads 39 and tobacconists Wash-
27. Id at 110.
28. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 39-40; 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at
147. This school is now George Washington University. M. Fleetwood, The Influence of Chief
Justices on the North Carolina Supreme Court Since 1900, at 6-7 (Dec. 1974) (unpublished paper
available in North Carolina Supreme Court Library, Raleigh, North Carolina); Note, Walter
Clark, 2 N.C.L. REv. 225, 226 (1924).
29. See supra text accompanying note 26.
30. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARM, supra note 1, at 149.
31. Id at 150.
32. Id at 151-53.
33. A. BRooKS, supra note 1, at 46.
34. Id at 49; 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 189.
35. A. BRooKS, supra note 1, at 49; 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 189.
36. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 189.
37. Id at 199.
38. A. BRooKS, supra note 1, at 49.
39. Id. at 49.
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ington and Benjamin Duke.40 For his practice Clark had the first, or one of
the first, typewriters owned in Raleigh.41 He also owned the most complete
legal library of any practicing lawyer in the state.42 After Clark became a
superior court judge, other judges holding court in Raleigh frequently re-
quested that Clark leave a key with the clerk of court so that they might use
his library.
43
During these years Clark wrote and annotated Clark's Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, which practicing lawyers in North Carolina long thereafter found es-
sential, and which the supreme court often cited with approval.44 He also
published Everybody's Book, Some Points in Law of Interest and Use to North
Carolina Farmers, Merchants, and Business Men Generally.45 He compiled and
distributed an index to cases that were implicitly, but not explicitly, overruled
by the supreme court. His papers include a January 9, 1877 letter from David
M. Furches, a superior court judge (1875-79), who later became an associate
justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court (1895-1901) and Clark's prede-
cessor as chief justice (1901-03), thanking Clark for a copy and criticizing the
court for its "mistake" of not stating that it was overruling an old case when it
effectively was doing so.
46
Clark's correspondence through these years reveals active interest and in-
volvement in North Carolina politics.47 He himself was supported by political
leaders in elections for state Attorney General (1880)48 and Governor
(1886),49 but he declined nomination for both positions.
IV. TRIAL JUDGE
Relatively little is known about Clark's years as a superior court judge.
Governor A.M. Scales appointed Clark to fill a vacancy on that bench in April
1885. He then was elected to this position in November 1886, and held it until
his appointment to the supreme court in 1889.50
Clark's appointment to the superior court was well received. Thomas M.
Holt, later Lieutenant Governor (1889-91) and Governor (1891-93),51 wrote to
40. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supranote 1, at 194-95, 197-98. Clark represented the
Dukes in the collection of their accounts. Id.
41. A. BRooKs, supra note 1, at 50 (stating that Clark purchased "the first typewriter that was
ever owned in Raleigh); 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 190 (stating that Clark
had "one of the first typewriters, if not the first in the city").
42. A. BRooKs, supra note 1, at 50.
43. Id. See, e.g., Letter from T.M. Argo, a Raleigh, North Carolina attorney, to Walter Clark
(Feb. 26, 1886) (relaying such a request from Judge Henry Groves Connor of Wilson, N.C.),
reprinted in I THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 226.
44. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 51.
45. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 189.
46. Id. at 193-94.
47. See generally id at 189-236.
48. Id. at 190, 209.
49. A. BRooKS, supra note 1, at 71-73; 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at
228, 231, 233-34, 240-41.
50. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 190.
5 1. Id at 220.
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Clark at the time:
You were my first choice and I earnestly hoped all the time that the
Governor would have wisdom enough to appoint you. I feel that one
more honest & impartial Judge has been added to the list, one who
knows the law, and knowing it, will administer it, without fear, or
favor. I am glad to see the papers endorsing your appointment.
52
Judge Henry Groves Connor, who later served with Clark on the supreme
court, wrote: "No man ever had the endorsement of the profession more unan-
imously than yourself and. . . no man was ever more entitled to it.
'53
The cases appealed from Clark's trial court that are reported in the North
Carolina Reports reveal little of note about him. The supreme court af-
firmed 54 or found no error55 in one hundred twenty-one cases 56 and dismissed
the appeal in six cases.57 It reversed,58 found error,59 granted a new trial, 60 or
arrested judgment 61 in fifty-six cases, remanded five cases, 62 modified two
cases,63 and disposed of four cases in other miscellaneous ways.
64
Clark once instructed the grand jury of Wake County that it was unlawful
to maintain a gambling house, and that it was their duty to indict all who
broke this law. In response, the grand jury indicted the operator of a gambling
house near the hostelry where visiting statesmen, legislators, and attorneys ap-
pearing before the supreme court commonly gathered. Accepting a guilty plea
to one count of the indictment, Clark imposed a substantial fine and a brief
prison sentence. The state's press praised him for his action, 65 and former
Governor W. W. Holden wrote him, saying:
52. Id at 224.
53. Id
54. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 106 N.C. 451, 11 S.E. 647 (1890); Reese v. Cole, 93 N.C. 87
(1885).
55. See, e.g., State v. Woods, 104 N.C. 898, 10 S.E. 555 (1889); State v. Terry, 93 N.C. 585
(1885).
56. These cases, and those referred to in the next sentence in the text, appear in volumes 93-
107 of the North Carolina Reports.
57. Porter v. Western N.C.R.R., 106 N.C. 478, 11 S.E. 515 (1890); State v. MeCoury, 103
N.C. 352, 9 S.E. 412 (1889); State v. Tow, 103 N.C. 350, 9 S.E. 411 (1889); State v. Goings, 100
N.C. 504, 6 S.E. 88 (1888); State v. Hazell, 95 N.C. 623 (1886); White v. Utley, 94 N.C. 511 (1886).
58. See, e.g., Armfield v. Colvert, 103 N.C. 147, 9 S.E. 461 (1889); Wilson v. Hughes, 94 N.C.
182 (1886).
59. See, e.g., Everett v. Raby, 104 N.C. 479, 10 S.E. 526 (1889); Lilly v. West, 97 N.C. 276, 1
S.E. 834 (1887).
60. See, e.g., State v. Calley, 104 N.C. 858, 10 S.E. 455 (1889); Young v. Herman, 97 N.C.
280, 1 S.E. 792 (1887).
61. See State v. Hazell, 100 N.C. 471, 6 S.E. 404 (1888).
62. Blanton v. Board of Comm'rs., 101 N.C. 532, 8 S.E. 162 (1888); Knott v. Taylor, 96 N.C.
553, 2 S.E. 680 (1887); Daniel v. Rogers, 95 N.C. 134 (1886); Carr v. Askew, 94 N.C. 194 (1886);
State v. Norwood, 93 N.C. 578 (1885).
63. Efland v. Efland, 96 N.C. 488, 1 S.E. 858 (1887); Jones v. Call, 96 N.C. 337, 2 S.E, 647
(1887).
64. Perkins v. Berry, 103 N.C. 131, 9 S.E. 621 (1889) (no error in plaintiff's appeal; modified
and affirmed in defendant's appeal); Williams v. McNair, 98 N.C. 332, 4 S.E. 131 (1887) (affirmed
in plaintiff's appeal, reversed in defendant's appeal); Perry v. Adams, 96 N.C. 347, 2 S.E. 659
(1887) (appeal continued to secure transcript); Scott v. Bryan, 96 N.C. 289, 3 S.E. 235 (1887)
(reference directed).
65. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 56-57.
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Allow me to express my high gratification at your action as
Judge in relation to the crime of gambling. The sentence pro-
nounced is moderate and just. For months and months that foul
gambling house has glared on the main street of our City, inviting
young and old men to bankruptcy, desperation, and ruin, and I have
wondered if there was no law to extinguish that baleful light. Thank
God, you have done that work!
66
Clark managed his courts with an efficiency unusual for his day. He in-
sisted that court open on time. He also insisted that litigants, witnesses, jurors,
and officers of the court be present and prepared.67 He was so adamant in
these practices that a rumor circulated that he even had fined himself for not
opening court on time. His papers, however, contain a self-serving memoran-
dum denying the rumor, and stating that, in his four and one-half years as a
trial judge, he never was absent a day or late a minute in opening court.
68
In November 1889 Governor Daniel G. Fowle appointed Clark associate
justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court. He was elected in 1890 to an
unexpired term of two years, and in 1894 to a full eight-year term.69 He be-
came "'universally regarded as the ablest man on the Court, and his critics
charged that he dominated it.' "70 Despite his seniority over the other associ-
ate justices and the high regard for his ability,71 however, it was only after a
difficult and bitter contest that he was nominated and elected chief justice in
1902.72 Clark was reelected in subsequent general elections, and served con-
tinuously until his death on May 19, 1924.73
V. SUPREME COURT YEARS
Clark's supreme court years are detailed in a biography by Aubrey Lee
Brooks74 titled Walter Clark: Fighting Judge.75 Brooks' treatment of Clark
exemplifies Robert Gittings' theory that a "biographer must suffer, not dully
but acutely, not only the wrongs but all the experiences, triumphant or disas-
trous, of the subject whose life he attempts to recreate. ' 76 It also exemplifies
Gittings' theory that "[a] biography is always apt to be more than an explora-
tion of one's subject; it becomes, at every step, an exploration of oneself.
66. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 225.
67. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 55; 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 190.
68. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 55-56.
69. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 239.
70. 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 8, at 3 (quoting A. BROOKS, upra note 1,
at 129).
71. The order of listing of the associate justices in the North Carolina Reports demonstrates
Clark's seniority. He was first listed as the senior associate justice in 120 N.C. iii (1897).
72. See A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 129-41; 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 8,
at 3-7. At that time, a convention of party delegates from the counties of the State nominated the
chief justice. Id. at 4. The qualified voters chose between the parties' nominees in the general
election.
73. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, supra note 1, at 581 n.9.
74. See I DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY 235-36 (W. Powell ed. 1979).
75. A. BRooKS, supra note 1.
76. R. GITTINGS, THE NATURE OF BIOGRAPHY 58 (1978).
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Many people have started writing biography, and found that this has led them
to be effectively writing their own autobiography."
77
Brooks obviously identified with Clark, and some have speculated that he
was writing the story of his own life rather than Clark's. It is necessary,
therefore, to examine Brooks briefly to understand fully his representation of
Clark.
The lives of Clark and Brooks were parallel in several respects. Although
Clark was Brooks' elder by a quarter of a century and Brooks lived more than
a quarter of a century after Clark died, the two nevertheless shared a consider-
able span of history. More importantly, they had many of the same
experiences.
Both Clark and Brooks were reared in rural North Carolina. Both com-
pleted the law course at the University of North Carolina and succeeded at the
practice of law.79 They were considered for appointment to the United States
Supreme Court-Clark by President Woodrow Wilson,80 and Brooks by Pres-
idents Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin D. Roosevelt8 l'-and
both engaged in intellectual or scholarly pursuits and published numerous
works.8
2
Perhaps most important, Brooks and Clark shared a common political
and intellectual heritage. They were Jeffersonian Democrats8 3 who lived
through, and were influenced by, the Progressive Era of American history.
Both lost United States Senate races to the political machine of the conserva-
77. Id at 85.
78. Lecture by Walter F. Pratt, Associate Professor of Law at Duke University, to his Legal
Biography class (Mar. 29, 1983). Six years after publication of his biography of Clark, Brooks
published his own autobiography. A. BROOKS, SOUTHERN LAWYER: FirY YEARS AT THE BAR
(1950).
79. Brooks, having practiced much longer, was far more successful than Clark. Clark appar-
ently lived primarily on his judicial salary most of his adult life, and died with a modest estate.
The inventory of his estate included real property valued at $54,000; of that amount, $34,000 was
for land in Halifax County, at least some, and presumably all, of which he inherited. The value of
his personal property at death was $16,011.93; after paying debts, taxes, and costs of administra-
tion, only $51.02 remained. Final Account of David Clark and Walter Clark, Jr., Executors of the
Estate of Walter Clark Deceased, ESTATE FILE No. 4929 (June 27, 1925) (available in Office of
Wake County Clerk of Superior Court, Raleigh, North Carolina.)
Brooks, on the other hand, established a scholarship fund in excess of $1,000,000 at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina, created a revolving trust fund for The University of North Carolina
Press, and made substantial gifts to his church and the Boy Scouts. 1 DICTIONARY OF NORTH
CAROLINA BIOoRAPHY, supra note 74, at 236.
On December 19, 1910, Clark made the following observation: "Tho I can hardly look for-
ward to remaining 12 years yet on the bench ... I hope I may be able to serve out 8 years
acceptably, unless I am starved out by the salary they give us." Letter from Walter Clark to
Armistead Burwell (Dec. 19, 1910) (available in Burwell Collection at University of North Caro-
lina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina).
80. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
81. 1 DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY, supra note 74, at 236.
82. See A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 257-65 (selected list of Clark's writings); 1 DICTIONARY
OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY, supra note 74, at 236.
83. A. BRooKS, supra note 1, at 41, 79, 83 (discussing Clark's adherence to Jefferson's views);
I DICTIONARY OF NORI CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY, supra note 74, at 235 (referring to Brooks as
"an avowed Jeffersonian Democrat").
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tive Furnifold Simmons; Clark lost in 1912 to Simmons himself,84 and Brooks
lost in 1920 to the Simmons candidate, Lee S. Overman. 85 Both fought power-
ful vested interests for much of their lives, particularly the railroads and the
tobacco monopoly.
8 6
Clark and Brooks revered each other. Clark called Brooks "the foremost
and most successful lawyer in North Carolina. '87 Brooks' biography of Clark
is sympathetic, indeed almost eulogistic. Dumas Malone stated that "a biogra-
phy should orientate its subject in history, though it should certainly not con-
tain a full story of the times. The man himself must be kept in the center of
the stage." 88 Although Brooks' biography of Clark reflects much of the back-
ground and spirit of their times, Clark is always indubitably at the center of
the stage.
After publication of the Clark biography, Brooks and Robert M. Win-
ston, a successful corporate attorney and superior court judge,8 9 exchanged
remarks that were surprisingly vituperative, given that they were published in
the normally staid North Carolina Law Review.9" Winston described aspects
of Brooks' book as "far from accurate and objective." 91 He noted that, from
Brooks' perspective, "[i]n every contest Clark's enemies are not only wrong but
wickedly so." 9 2 He described some of Brooks' phraseology as "language of
the fiery stump orator . . . and not of the historian." 93 Winston depicted
Clark as "radical of the radicals" 94 and a "radical reformer," 95 referred to
Clark's "strange, radical notions," 96 and derided Clark's competence in the
substantive law.
97
In a subsequent issue of the Review,98 Brooks retorted:
84. See A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 177-9 1.
85. See 1 DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY, supra note 74, at 235.
86. See A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 85-101 (Clark); 1 DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA
BIOGRAPHY, supra note 74, at 235 (Brooks).
87. 1 DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY, supra note 74, at 235.
88. D. MALONE, BIOGRAPHY AND HISTORY, reprinted in THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY
121, 141 (J. Strayer ed. 1943).
89. Winston, later in life, wrote a biography of Horace Williams, a philosophy professor. R.
WINSTON, HORACE WILLIAMS: THE GADFLY OF CHAPEL HILL (1942). Williams was immortal-
ized as Virgil Weldon, the "Hegel in the Cotton Belt," by the novelist Thomas Wolfe. See T.
WOLFE, LOOK HOMEWARD, ANGEL 496-99 (1957).
90. Winston's review of the book is in Winston, supra note 15; Brooks' response is in Brooks,
Reply to Reiew by A W. Winston of WALTER CLARK, FIGHTING JUDGE, 22 N.C.L. REv. 353
(1944).
For other reviews, see Brogan, Book Review, 62 LAW Q. REv. 94 (1946); Dann, Book Review,
6 FED. B.J. 355 (1945); Lee, Book Review, 18 TEM. L.Q. 429 (1944); Young, Book Review, 12 U.
CHI. L. REv. 306 (1945); Book Review, 30 A.B.A. J. 680 (1944).




95. Id at 183.
96. Id at 182.
97. Id. at 184-85. Winston stated: "[p]erhaps had [Clark] paid a little more attention to
Blackstone ... he might have ranked with Ruffin and Pearson." Id at 185.
98. Brooks, supra note 90.
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It is well known among their intimates that Judge Winston and
Judge Clark had a very poor opinion of each other. Now that
Clark's lips have been sealed in death for more than twenty years, I,
as his biographer, am interested in seeing that justice is done to his
memory.
The reading public has a right to assume that anyone reviewing
a book in a publication like yours is disinterested and certainly not
unfriendly to the subject of the book. In this case the reverse is pa-
tently true.99
He proceeded to rebut many of Winston's assertions, and concluded that
"Winston's feigned resentment against Clark is not because he was a fighting
judge but because he fought on the wrong side, according to Winston."'1'0
VI. MINORITIES, CHILDREN, AND WOMEN
A jurist who evokes such vehement controversy twenty years after his
death presumably is a significant historical figure. Brooks posits that Clark
was significant, in notable part, for his advocacy for minorities, children, and
women. 101 The sections that follow examine those advocacies and the validity
of Brooks' thesis.
A1. Minorities
Some evidence supports Brooks' thesis that Clark was a significant advo-
cate for minorities. Much, however, contradicts that thesis.
Clark and Brooks had similar youthful relationships with black people,
the largest minority group of their region. Brooks wrote of his own childhood
that he enjoyed what he considered "the last word in human happiness-a
gun, a dog, and a negro boy chum."102 He wrote of Clark's childhood:
His playmates. . . were mostly Negro boys of his own age and older.
One who has never shared such an experience cannot possibly under-
stand the thrill and joy of a white boy privileged to play, hunt, and
swim with Negro urchins who obeyed and adored him and called
him "Master." Indeed these playmates possessed all the virtues of
the Negro without many of the vices of the whites. 103
There is considerable evidence that Clark, throughout his life, related to
and cared for people on an individual level who, in the parlance of his time,
were "colored" or "negro." When he joined the Army of Northern Virginia' 0 4
as a young man, his father gave him a bodyguard, "a Negro boy named
Neverson, only two years older than Walter, but intelligent and devoted to his
99. Id at 353.
100. Id at 355.
101. See A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 161-76.
102. 1 DICnONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BiooRAPHY, supra note 74, at 235.
103. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 30-3 1.
104. Although Clark was a North Carolina resident, he joined the Army of Northern Virginia
because the Army was comprised of troops from the Easternmost Confederate States.
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young master."105 On November 26, 1861, Clark wrote to his mother from
camp, "if I can get the appointment [as regiment adjutant], I will be home to
get my horse and boy & other things." 1° 6 His letters home during the war
refer frequently to Neverson and show genuine concern about his health and
well-being.10 7 On November 9, 1862, Clark wrote to his father: "Neverson
. . . waits on mefirst rate, he was a little green at first about camp.. . but now
I couldn't have a better (or honester) boy to wait on me."
10 8
Clark's papers include some indication of cordial relations with black
leaders in his later years. A July 1, 1916 letter to Clark from Rev. W. Richard
Gullins, of St. Paul A.M.E. Church in Raleigh states: "We are profoundly
grateful for the interest you have heretofore manifested in us and hope to ever
prove worthy of your confidence." 109 A December 18, 1916 letter to Clark
from Milton K. Tyson of Burlington states that "[tlhe colored Business men,
throughout has [sic] planed [sic] to hold in Greensboro, July, 4, 5-6, 7, what
will be known as the North Carolina Negro Business Men's Congress, and
desire your presence to deliver an address on one of the above days."'110
105. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 50.
106. Id. at 62.
107. Id at 50.
108. Id at 92.
109. Letter from Rev. W. Richard Gullins to Walter Clark (July 1, 1916) (available in The
Clark Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, North Carolina).
110. Letter from Milton K. Tyson to Walter Clark (Dec. 18, 1916) (available in The Clark
Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, North Carolina).
A July 25, 1918 letter to Clark from O.R. Pope of the Fayetteville State Colored Normal
School states: "[Wle are writing to express to you our sense of high appreciation ... for the
recent valuable contribution which you so generously made to the history of our state and country
by giving to the press and the world the significant chapter: 'Part of Negroes in Previous Wars,'
found in a column of the Fayetteville Daily Observer, July 23rd, 1918." Letter from O.R. Pope to
Walter Clark (July 25, 1918) (available in The Clark Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Ra-
leigh, North Carolina). Clark responded to the director of the school:
I know of no more useful work than that in which the teachers and ministers of the
colored people of this State are engaged in raising the standard of intelligence and of
right living among that one third of our people, who, in spite of the handicaps due to
circumstances over which they had no control, are steadily rising in well being and well
doing and upon whose loyalty and industry, and patriotism so largely depends the pros-
perity of our great State.
2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 8, at 376.
Clark and James E. Shepard, founder and first president of the North Carolina College for
Negroes-now North Carolina Central University-corresponded periodically. On September 6,
1906, Shepard wrote to Clark: "I have just read your magnificent and scholarly article on the
Constitution in the Independent. Altho a colored man I rejoice in the fact, that we have a man in
North Carolina of such standing and attainments." Letter from Dr. James E. Shepard to Walter
Clark (Sept. 6, 1906) (available in The Clark Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh,
North Carolina). In 1919 Shepard wrote Clark a letter of appreciation for the services Clark had
rendered to black people and for his consistent justice in dealing with them. A. BROOKS, supra
note 1, at 175. Clark replied:
I have been the employer of colored labor ever since I became of age. I know them well
and I have never received anything but kindness at their hands. I have the kindest feel-
ing for the race and have seen the difficulties which surround their efforts to rise to better
things. In my judgment, the best remedy for the situation in which the colored people
find themselves is that which your race has been observing; i.e., extend the education as
far as possible to all your people, impress upon them sobriety, self-control under what at
times may be aggravating circumstances, the acquirement of property by industry and
thrift, and the attainment, by their personal conduct, of the respect of white people.
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Clark's family plantation, which had many slaves during his youth,"'
had numerous negro tenants throughout his life. 112 Clark reputedly dealt with
them in a kind and considerate manner.1 13 On Clark's last visit to the planta-
tion a few months before his death, one of the tenants told Clark that he
needed an overcoat for the winter; Clark responded by removing his own coat
and giving it to the man.'
14
A newspaper account of Clark's funeral states:
[O]f them all who followed behind moving with feeble step, slow al-
most as the tolling of the muffled bell in the belfry above was George
Alston, devoted servant to the Chief Justice for half a century, and
who bears honorably wounds received in battle, and still carries
against his skull a bullet brought home from battle. The Chief Jus-
tice had no more devoted friend than his former slave and held for
him a deep affection. He sat bowed with grief, with the members of
the Court.'
15
To conclude from this evidence that Clark was a prophetic precursor of
the civil rights movement, however, would be inaccurate. The sparse remain-
ing evidence suggests the contrary.
At age nineteen, in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, Clark be-
gan to publish letters in newspapers. In the letters he criticized the baneful
effects of slavery and urged the importation of free white labor into the
South."16 He insisted that the South must rid itself "of the dead body of slav-
ery, and with it dispose of the perplexing questions of negro suffrage and ne-
gro equality forever."' 1 7 Clark wrote:
These things your people have been doing for many years. You have risen steadily in
the scale as to those things which command respect, and a steadily increasing number of
white men everywhere are appreciating the change. Avoid giving this a setback by the
intemperate utterances, especially by the young men of your race who are impatient at
what they deem continued injustice. Most often this matter is due to the language used
by office-seekers, who appeal to and excite race prejudice for their personal ends. I am
sure that the vast majority of the white people of North Carolina wish to do equal and
exact justice to the colored race, and their number is increasing with the proofs which the
colored people are giving that they are better educated and are attaining a higher stan-
dard of morality and right living.
Id at 175-76; see also 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 8, at 391-92.
In a case involving the flogging of a convict, Clark wrote:
It is probable. . . that the man. . . brutally treated by an agent of the State of North
Carolina while in its custody and under its protection was a negro; but that is no defense.
It matters not what color an African sun has printed upon him. He was a human being
and entitled to the elementary rights of a man.
State v. Mincher, 172 N.C. 895, 902, 90 S.E. 429, 432 (1916) (Clark, C.J., concurring).
111. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 28.
112. Id. at 253.
113. Id
114. Id. at 253-54.
115. The News and Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina), May 21, 1924, at I, col. 2, at 14,
col. 2.
116. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note I, at 145.
117. Id. at 156-57. The full text of the letter appears in 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK,
supra note 1, at 156-59.
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The negro cannot live among us in the present state of things. The
proclamation of his freedom was the death knell of his race....
• . . The negro has fulfilled his mission. He must now pass from
the stage....
North Carolina will not, cannot [,] leave her future to the guardian-
ship of the freed-negro.
• . . The Negro cannot remain here forever in his present anom-
alous condition. The future of the State cannot be made to depend
upon the willingness to work of a race for whom hitherto, we have
considered that now proscribed instrument, the lash, as peculiarly
appropriate. The white laborer must come, but the interests of the
State demand that he shall come now ...
• . . Fill your villages, your towns and your workshops with a
hard working, intelligent population, unembittered by distinction of
race, and you place the prosperity of this State beyond the reach of
envy or the votes of a Black Republican Congress."18
Clark's judicial opinions dealing with minorities also suggest that he
shared, or at least uncritically accepted, the prevailing sentiments of his time.
There is no evidence that he was particularly sensitive to racially discrimina-
tory practices. In State v. Wolf 19 the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that an act providing a special school district for Cherokee Indians was not
unconstitutional class legislation. Clark's opinion acknowledged, without
question or criticism, the general law that "'Indians are the domestic subjects
of the particular European or American State in which they happen to
be.' "120 He stated that "[tlhe white and colored races compose the bulk of the
people of [North Carolina]," and acknowledged, again without question or
criticism, the constitutional provision for racially segregated public schools.'
2'
"The act is not discriminative," he said, "because it applies alike to all Indians
in that school district. It could not apply to other races, which go to their own
race schools."'
122
In a subsequent 1907 decision, Frazier v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indi-
ans,123 Clark appended a "Note" on the history of the Indians in North Caro-
lina. He stated, "[I]t may not be amiss to note here the uniform kindly
treatment by this State of the Cherokees in her borders."' 24 This note empha-
sizes Clark's paternalistic interest in treating members of this minority well,
but demonstrates that he was not sensitive to discrimination against them.
118. Id at 156-57, 162.
119. 145 N.C. 440, 59 S.E. 40 (1907).
120. Id. at 444, 59 S.E. at 42 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)).
121. Id at 444-45, 59 S.E. at 42.
122. Id. at 445, 59 S.E. at 42.
123. 146 N.C. 477, 59 S.E. 1005 (1907).
124. Id at 480, 59 S.E. at 1007.
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In Ferrall v. Ferrall12 5 a husband sought a divorce, alleging that when he
married he did not know that his wife "was and is of negro descent within the
third generation." 126 The jury found that the wife was not of negro descent,
and that the husband had abandoned her. Although the trial court set aside
the verdict because of erroneous instructions regarding the meaning of "real
negro," the supreme court reversed and ordered judgment entered on the
verdict.1
27
Clark's concurring opinion in Ferrall may be viewed simply as a defense
of a wronged woman128 or potentially wronged children.' 29 It also reflects,
however, his implicit acceptance of the common view of the negro race at that
time. Clark deplored the husband's consignment of his wife "to the associa-
tion of the colored race which he so affects to despise."' 130 He stated that the
husband's action "would brand [his children] for all time, by the judgment of a
court, as negroes-a fate which their white skin will make doubly humiliating
to them,"'131 and noted that "of all men he should have welcomed the verdict
that decided his wife and children are white."'
132
In State v. Darnel1133 the court reviewed a municipal ordinance which
stated that if the houses on the two streets adjacent to a particular street were
occupied by a greater number of whites than blacks, then a black person could
not occupy any house on that particular street. Similarly, white people could
not occupy houses on streets where more houses were occupied by blacks than
whites. Clark's opinion held that the ordinance was outside the municipality's
authority to enact ordinances for the general welfare. Clark noted that if this
ordinance were permissible, aldermen could require Democrats to live on one
street, Republicans on another, or Protestants on one street and Catholics on
another. '
34
The decision was not premised on preventing racial discrimination, but
on "the fundamental right of every one to acquire and dispose of property by
sale."'135 Clark, referring to the natural law, stated that this right of sale was
"not conferred by the Constitution, but exists of natural right.' 136 He uncriti-
cally accepted racially discriminatory legislation, stating: 'There is no ques-
tion that legislation can control social rights by forbidding intermarriage of the
125. 153 N.C. 174, 69 S.E. 60 (1910).
126. Id at 174, 69 S.E. at 60.
127. Id at 179, 69 S.E. at 62.
128. See infra notes 206-66 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 147-205 and accompanying text.
130. Ferrall, 153 N.C. at 180, 69 S.E. at 62.
131. Id
132. Id Clark noted that "[tihe eloquent counsel for the [husband] depicted the infamy of
social degradation from the slightest infusion of negro blood." Id He concluded that "[the hus-
band] deems it perdition for himself to associate with those possessing the slightest suspicion of
negro blood, but strains every effort to consign the wife of his bosom and the innocent children of
his loins to poverty and to the infamy that he depicts." Id at 181, 69 S.E. at 63,
133. 166 N.C. 300, 81 S.E. 338 (1914).
134. Id at 302, 81 S.E. at 339.
135. Id. at 304-05, 81 S.E. at 340.
136. Id at 304, 81 S.E. at 340.
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races, and in requiring Jim Crow cars and in similar matters."'137
In Johnson v. Board of Education138 Clark, without opinion, concurred
only in the holding that a local board of education could exclude from white
schools a child with less than one-sixteenth negro blood. The opinion vehe-
mently supports segregation, suggesting that any mixing of the races whatso-
ever would destroy proper school regulation and discipline and would
culminate in disruption of the school system.
139
Since Clark did not file a concurring opinion, the basis of his disagree-
ment with the court's rationale is unclear. He later cited Johnson uncritically,
however, in a case that upheld, against evidentiary arguments, a finding that
plaintiff's children were of unmixed white blood and thus entitled to attend a
white school.14°
In a 1919 address to the law class at the University of North Carolina,
Clark rejected four suggested solutions-amalgamation, extermination, emi-
gration, or servitude- to "the effect of the negro element in our midst."' 141 He
displayed insensitivity by arguing that the country was dependent on black
labor. He concluded that "[i]n truth, there is no 'negro problem.' "142 In the
same address Clark also argued for women's suffrage on the ground that
"[tihere are 53,000 more white women in North Carolina than all the negro
men and negro women put together, and the admission of the women to the
ballot box will be the only certain guarantee of white supremacy."' 143 He
stated:
We have to face a condition, and not a theory, and our surest protec-
tion is to increase the white vote by doubling the white majority. We
have in this State about 70 white men to every 30 negroes-a white
majority of 40. When women are admitted to suffrage we shall
double these figures and will have 140 white voters for every 60
colored-a white majority of 80, just double. 144
He had written previously, during his 1902 campaign for chief justice, that
"the proper order of things. . demand[s] Anglo-Saxon supremacy."'
145
This evidence conflicts with Brooks' apotheosized treatment of Clark's
views on, and relation to, minorities. The chief justice was not a forerunner of
the civil rights movement. Clark, however, should not be criticized unduly for
137. Id Clark did not cite Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896), decided 18 years
earlier, which upheld "separate but equal" racial accommodations on railroad coaches.
138. 166 N.C. 468, 82 S.E. 832 (1914).
139. Id at 473, 82 S.E. at 834.
140. Medlin v. County Bd. of Educ., 167 N.C. 239, 83 S.E. 483 (1914).
141. W. Clark, Address to University of North Carolina Law Class, Chapel Hill, North Caro-
lina 6 (Jan. 31, 1919) (unpublished address available in North Carolina Supreme Court Library,
Raleigh, North Carolina).
142. Id. at 7.
143. Id at 8.
144. Id at 8-9. Clark previously had made essentially this same argument in an address in
Greenville, North Carolina. W. Clark, Ballots for Both, Address to Equal Suirage League,
Greenville, North Carolina (Dec. 8, 1916) (unpublished address available in the North Carolina
State Library, Raleigh, North Carolina).
145. H. PAOE, SOME CAMPAoN LEarERs 58 (1902).
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his views; sentiments and practices now deplored as racist and discriminatory
were the entrenched consensus of his time. "The felt necessities of the
time"' 46 demanded them. The fact that Clark supported, or at least accepted,
those views, does not necessarily condemn him.
B. Children
Brooks also posits that Clark was an important advocate for children, pri-
marily because of Clark's concern for infants injured in the workplace or by
the torts of their parents. Clark contributed significantly to the abolition of
common-law doctrines unfavorable to children in these areas and to the adop-
tion of legal policies protecting them.
In an early decision involving infants in the workplace, Sims . Lind-
say, 47 a steam laundry mangle mashed a thirteen-year-old plaintiff's hand in
its rollers, necessitating amputation of her fingers. Plaintiff, however, testified
that she was working at the machine with knowledge that the machine was
dangerous and had no guard. The trial court held that she was contributorily
negligent and sustained defendant's demurrer.148
A unanimous supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Clark, awarded a
new trial. The court concluded that, "Ilt is the employer, not the employee,
who should be fixed with knowledge of defective appliances and held liable
for [the young girl's] injuries resulting from their use."'149 Otherwise, the opin-
ion does not comment on the baneful effects of child labor.
Such commentary first appears in Ward v. Odell Manufacturing Co.,' 50 in
which an evenly divided court affirmed, without precedential value, an award
to a twelve-year-old plaintiff who lost an eye while working for defendant.
Clark's opinion demonstrates his characteristic bifurcation- theoretical defer-
ence to the legislature in public policy matters, combined with a tangible judi-
cial activism generally associated with the realist school of jurisprudence. 15 '
The following language is illustrative:
The humanity of the age has, in very many of the States, placed on
the statute books laws forbidding the employment of children under
14 years of age in factories. So far as these statutes are based upon
the inhumanity of shutting up these little prisoners 11 to 12 hours a
day.. . in the stifling atmosphere of such buildings, or depriving
146. 0. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Although it is idle to speculate on what his
views would have been if he had lived at a later time, Clark's entire career suggests that he proba-
bly would have promoted equal opportunity and equal justice, regardless of race. A fair assess-
ment of the record, however, suggests that he did not transcend his own time by promoting such
causes then.
147. 122 N.C. 678, 30 S.E. 19 (1898).
148. Id at 681, 30 S.E. at 20.
149. Id at 682, 30 S.E. at 20.
150. 126 N.C. 946, 36 S.E. 194 (1900).
151. See G. WHiTE, supra note 3, at 268 (discussing the realist school of jurisprudence); see
also G. WmmrT, PATTERNS OF AMERCiAN LEWAL. THOUGHT 116-32, 137-44 (1978) [hereinafter




them of opportunity for education, or using the competition of their
cheap wages to reduce those of maturer age, these are arguments on
matters of public policy which must be addressed solely to the legis-
lative department. But there is an aspect in which the matter is for
the courts; that is, whether it is negligence per se for a great factory to
take children of such immature development of mind and body, and
expose them for twelve hours per day to the dangers incident to a
great building filled with machinery constantly whirring at a high
speed. The children, without opportunity of education, without rest,
their strength over-taxed, their perceptions blunted by fatigue, their
intelligence dwarfed by their treadmill existence, are over-liable to
accidents. Can it be said that such little creatures, exposed to such
dangers against their wills, are guilty of contributory negligence,-
the defense here set up? Does the law, justly interpreted, visit such
liability upon little children? . . . The factory superintendent put
these children to work, knowing their immaturity of mind and body;
and when one of them, thus placed by him in places requiring con-
stant watchfulness, is injured, every sentiment of justice forbids that
the corporation should rely on the plea of contributory negligence.15 2
In a subsequent case in which Clark wrote the majority opinion, Fitzger-
ald v. Alma Furniture Co., 153 the court upheld an award to a nine-year-old
employee whose hand was mashed in an industrial machine. Again, Clark's
language is significant.
It does not appear, and cannot be ascertained, how this injury oc-
curred. The little sufferer, in his artless testimony, says he does not
know. . . . If, as is probable, from his account, he thought to rest his
tired little legs by leaning against the machine . . ., and, dropping
asleep, he unconsciously flung his arm over the top to rest himself or
to keep from falling, or if. . ., with the curiosity and lack of judg-
ment nature makes incident to nine years of age, he climbed upon
the machine "to see the wheels go round," and touched them, this
(there having been, as he testifies, no instruction or warning from the
employer as to the danger) would. . .justify the finding of the jury.
The court below did not charge. . that employing a child of nine
years of age in such dangerous work especially without instruction,
was per se negligence. . . . But as [this] is a subject of growing im-
portance to lawyers, as well as in public interest generally, it may be
well to cite, as indicative of the conclusion to which the maturer
judgment of mankind is tending, the age below which legislative con-
struction in other States ha[s] made it illegal, and therefore negli-
gence per se and irrebutable, to employ any child in a factory ...
With this consensus of opinion in nearly the entire civilized
world it might be that it would not have been error if the judge had
held that it was negligence per se to put a child of the tender age of
nine years to work on a dangerous machine which he had never seen
152. Ward, 126 N.C. at 947-49, 36 S.E. at 195.
153. 131 N.C. 636, 42 S.E. 946 (1902).
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before, without any instructions or warning, and to leave him there
by himself without stopping the machine. But, however that may be,
it certainly was not error to leave the question of negligence to the
jury .... 154
North Carolina enacted legislation in 1903 that prohibited the employ-
ment in factories of children under the age of twelve and limited the work
week of employees under age eighteen. 155 Clark, having supported child labor
laws long before his state adopted them, strictly construed the new laws
against the employer.156 In his 1912 campaign for the United States Senate he
demanded their strict enforcement. 157 Further, when the limited child labor
law was inadequate, Clark continued his effort to protect these children.
In Pettit v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad58 the court, over Clark's dissent,
upheld the nonsuit of a wrongful death action by the administrator of the
estate of a twelve-year-old railroad messenger boy. The only evidence was
that the youth was last seen riding defendant's box car; later he was found
lying on defendant's track with one leg severed from his body. The court held
that this evidence was insufficient to go to the jury on the question of defend-
ant's negligence. 159
Clark protested vigorously. He noted that the boy "had not taken off
knee pants"'160 and that "[a] more deadly and perilous place [for him] could
not be imagined."'
161
The little child being found dead with his leg cut off in such a net-
work of tracks, among constantly shifting trains, creates as strong a
presumption that his leg was cut off by one of these trains as when a
soldier is found dead on a battlefield with a bullet through his head,
that he was killed by the enemy. 162
According to Clark, the court's opinion
defeat[s] recovery for the death of the little sufferer who by the ava-
rice of the defendant was sent to his death by exposure to an accumu-
lation of perils greater to him in his unguarded and unwarned
innocence than that which met the charging column of brave men on
Cemetery Ridge. Many soldiers survived four years of war. This
154. Id at 641-44, 42 S.E. at 948.
155. Act of Mar. 6, 1903, ch. 473, 1903 N.C. Pub. Laws 819. North Carolina was one of the
last states to pass a child labor law. A. Whitener, Judge Walter Clark, His Social and Political
Ideas 15 (1928) (unpublished master's thesis available in Duke University Library, Durham,
North Carolina).
156. A. Whitener, supra note 155, at 141.
157. 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, suranote 8, at 125. Today, a justice cannot campaign
for the Senate, while continuing to serve as a justice, without violating the Code of Judicial Con-
duct. "A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candidate either in a party primary or
a general election for a non-judicial office . N.C. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7A(3)
(Supp. 1983).
158. 156 N.C. 119, 72 S.E. 195 (1911).
159. Id at 129, 72 S.E. at 199.
160. Id at 133, 72 S.E. at 200.
161. Id at 134, 72 S.E. at 200.
162. Id at 135, 72 S.E. at 201.
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child was slain on the fourth day of his employment. 163
He went on to contend that the "munificent sum of $12.50 per month" paid to
the youth was "'the price of innocent blood."' Once again Clark invoked the
natural law, appealing to "principles of right and justice" and to a belief that
"[o]ur law is humane."'164
In Evans v. Dare Lumber Co.,165 Clark wrote for a unanimous court, re-
versing the nonsuit of an action by a ten-year-old boy who had lost an arm
attempting to straighten a board on "live rollers" while working at a lumber
mill.' 66 Clark referred to his opinions in Ward 167 and Fitzgerald,168 in which
the court first dealt with the "question of it being negligence per se to work
children of tender years in factories."'169 He stated:
There was negligence on the part of the defendant in allowing
this boy 10 years of age to work in the factory; in allowing him to
work in a dangerous place, and in allowing the live rollers to be oper-
ated without being boxed. The defendant's superintendent saw the
boy there and made no objection to his working.'
70
In Hauser v. Forsyth Furniture Co.,' 7 1 an action in which a thirteen-year-
old had been denied damages from his employer for physical injuries, the
court awarded a new trial for failure to charge the jury on the presumption
that the minor plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. Concurring
in the result, Clark wrote that since the employer's offense was a crime, con-
tributory negligence could not be a defense.' 72 He castigated "the influences
of the common law under which women and children had no rights which the
stronger were compelled to respect" and "'judge-made' law, formulated in a
rude and barbarous age."' 173 Clark noted that "it could hardly be expected
that the common law, which so largely was created by unmarried priests (the
judges of England), should have woven into it an adequate consideration of
the rights of women and children."'174 He concluded:
The statutes of to-day [sic] are the formulated legal expression of
the will of the people of this day and generation, and they must be
construed in that light, and not according to the views of the priests
and other judges . . . whose decisions created the "common law"
163. Id at 136, 72 S.E. at 201.
164. Id at 137, 72 S.E. at 201-02.
165. 174 N.C. 31, 93 S.E. 430 (1917).
166. Id. at 34, 93 S.E. at 431 (stating that a statute, passed in 1903 and amended in 1907, had
made employment of a child under age 12 a misdemeanor).
167. Ward v. Odell Mfg. Co., 126 N.C. 946, 36 S.E. 194 (1900); see supra notes 150-52 and
accompanying text.
168. Fitzgerald v. Alma Furniture Co., 131 N.C. 636, 42 S.E. 946 (1902); see supra notes 153-
54 and accompanying text.
169. Evans, 174 N.C. at 34, 93 S.E. at 431.
170. Id at 33, 93 S.E. at 431.
171. 174 N.C. 463, 93 S.E. 961 (1917).
172. Id. at 466, 93 S.E. at 962.
173. Id at 467, 93 S.E. at 962.
174. Id.
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under which women, children, and laborers were alike
submerged....
The world moves on to a higher plane, and the law must move
with it to a juster and a clearer regard of the rights of those who have
so long needed its protection and have asked in vain.
175
Finally, in Butner v. Brown Brothers Lumber Co., 176 the court reversed an
award to an eleven-year-old who had lost an arm in a mill accident. With
characteristic ardor, Clark dissented, concluding that "[t]his child, 11 years old
at the time, must go through life with one arm gone. He gave his account how
it happened. The jury said he told the truth; can we say the contrary?"' 177
Clark's opinions on children's rights in the workplace were influential
during his life and beyond. In another area relating to legal rights of children,
he presaged Justice Traynor by attempting to eliminate the defense of parental
immunity for torts committed against children.178 That effort, however, came
to fruition only posthumously; a dissenting opinion that Clark wrote less than
a year before his death clearly influenced legislative debate over this issue
more than half a century later.
In Small v. Morrison179 a nine-year-old child, injured in a collision while
in an automobile driven by her father, brought suit against the father, his in-
surance carrier, and the driver of the second vehicle. The father and the car-
rier demurred, in part because plaintiff, an unemancipated minor, could not
sue her parent and her right to proceed against the carrier depended on her
right to sue her father.
The court, on the sole ground that plaintiff could not sue her father, up-
held the sustaining of the demurrer. The majority opinion noted the paucity
of cases on the subject, and concluded that the relative absence of authority
demonstrated "not only the soundness of the position, but also that it is
founded in natural justice and in keeping with the eternal fitness of things
... 8. ,10 It cited cases referring to (1) "'[t]he peace of society, and of the
families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve
the repose of families and the best interests of society' ";181 (2) "'preserving
harmony in. . .domestic relations' ,,;182 and (3)" 'the maintenance of harmo-
nious and proper family relations . . . conducive to good citizenship
.... ,,,"183 The ratio decidendi was "practical considerations of public policy,
which discourage causes of action that tend to destroy parental authority and
175. Id at 468-69, 93 S.E. at 963.
176. 180 N.C. 612, 105 S.E. 319 (1920).
177. Id at 619, 105 S.E. 322.
178. See G. WHrrE, supra note 3, at 309 (Traynor "undermined the defense of immunity,
whether charitable, sovereign, or family, in negligence actions.").
179. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
180. Id at 579, 118 S.E. at 13.
181. Id at 580, 118 S.E. at 13 (quoting 20 RULING CASE LAW § 36 (1918)).
182. Id at 581, 118 S.E. at 14 (quoting Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 243, 79 P. 788, 788
(1905)).
183. Id (quoting Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 244, 79 P. 788, 788 (1905)).
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to undermine the security of the home."' 84 Ignoring the father's liability in-
surance, the court observed that "[o permit a minor child to sue its father for
a tortious wrong would be to allow the child to take from its parent that which
is already dedicated to its support and maintenance."'
' 8 5
Clark alone dissented. He called the insurance carrier's defense-that the
insured party was the parent of plaintiff--"the barest camouflage."' 8 6 "The
contract does not except injuries to any person, and the company is in no wise
affected by the relationship of the party injured to the assured," he stated.
18 7
The "action is in reality one. . . against the indemnity company (for the de-
murrer admits that the father is insolvent) and [the driver of the second vehi-
clel."' 88 Clark rejected the majority's assertion that their holding was based
on the common law, noting that no statute or common-law decision adopted
by the State required the result.' 89 He cited numerous North Carolina cases in
which children had sued their parents, 190 and traced all contrary foreign au-
thority to an 1891 Mississippi case. 191 Even those contrary decisions, he ar-
gued, would not apply "where the action is by the child as beneficiary of a
policy for indemnity, . and the relationship is purely an incidental matter
and irrelevant."192
"By what authority," he asked, "can the courts now create such law, and
by their own fiat shut the doors of justice in the faces of the helpless, who do
most need protection?"' 193 He characterized the majority holding as "a most
flagrant defect of justice," and concluded:
It is the essential function of the courts to administer justice, and
while they will not overrule a statute, they should not hesitate to
overrule a precedent to attain that end when it has not become a rule
of property. For a stronger reason, the courts should never create a
precedent (when there is, as here, neither statute nor precedent) upon
a supposed public policy, and when, as in this case, it will deprive
any one of just rights.
194
Both before and after the Small decision, Clark discussed the immunity
issue with contemporary legal figures. While considering the case, he wrote to
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "As you are a recognized authority on the
common law, can you dictate to your Secretary a reference to any English
184. Id at 584, 118 S.E. at 15.
185. Id at 585, 118 S.E. at 15.
186. Id at 589, 118 S.E. at 18 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
187. Id at 589-90, 118 S.E. at 18 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 590, 118 S.E. at 18 (Clark, C.J, dissenting).
189. Id N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1981), first adopted in 1715, declares that the common law is
in force in the state unless "abrogated, repealed, or ... obsolete." This statute "adopted the
common law of England as of the date of the signing of the Declaration of Independence." Steel-
man v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 592, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1971).
190. Small, 185 N.C. at 592-93, 118 S.E. at 19-20 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
191. Id at 598, 118 S.E. at 22 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). The Mississippi case is Hewlett v.
George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
192. Small, 185 N.C. at 601, 118 S.E. at 24 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
193. Id at 602, 118 S.E. at 24 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
194. Id at 603-04, 118 S.E. at 25 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
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authorities on the subject?. . .There is no statute or decision in this State that
such action cannot be brought[,] but the defendant relies upon the common
law . . ,,195 Holmes replied:
There is no surer way of proving a man's ignorance than by as-
suming that he knows. I cannot refer you to any English case. I can
only say that I don't believe that a suit by a child against its parent
would be found in the old books. I venture to suggest that the family
relations are so modified in our day that we are free to consider the
question a principle of policy. I am truly sorry not to be of any
help.
196
After the court rendered its decision, Clark sent the opinions to Roscoe
Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law School. Pound's response supported Clark's
view:
You certainly are upon strong ground. After all, why should we re-
quire the legislature to do things of this sort that ought to be done,
and that we used to do, through judicial decisions? . . . So long as
your court was not bound by any authoritative precedent I think
your attitude decidedly the right one.197
Clark also sent a copy to W.S. Holdsworth, Professor of Law at All Soul's
College, Oxford, England, and author of the then latest work on the "History
of the English Law."' 9 8 Holdsworth replied that the parent-child immunity
doctrine had "never been asserted." 199 Thereafter, Clark forwarded copies of
Holdsworth's letter to others, and lamented his colleagues' refusal to correct
"the inadvertence, for such it was.120° He also wrote to all superior court
judges in North Carolina advising them of the responses to his inquiries.
20 '
The "inadvertence" of the Small decision remained the law in North Car-
olina for over half a century.20 2 Fifty-two years later the General Assembly
partially abrogated the doctrine in an act providing that "[tihe relationship of
parent and child shall not bar the right of action by a minor child against a
parent for personal injury or property damage arising out of the operation of a
motor vehicle owned or operated by such parent.
' 20 3
In the 1975 legislative debate insurance company lobbyists opposing the
proposed bill appeared before legislative committees and cited policy consid-
erations articulated by the majority in Smal--the repose of families and pres-
195. 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 8, at 461.
196. Id. at 462.
197. Id at 465-66.
198. Id at 473-74.
199. Id at 474.
200. Id at 473-76.
201. Id at 471-72.
202. See, e.g., Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972) (citing Small, 184 N.C,
577, 118 S.E. 12); Carver v. Carver, 55 N.C. App. 716, 286 S.E.2d 799 (1982) (citing Small, 184
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12), cert. granted, 307 N.C. 576, 299 S.E.2d 645 (1983).
203. Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 685, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 911 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
539.21 (1983)). The Act was effective October 1, 1975, and applied to causes of action arising on
and after that date. Id
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ervation of domestic harmony.2°4 Legislators opposing the bill also read from
the majority opinion during floor debate.
Supporters, in response, referred primarily to the arguments articulated in
Clark's dissent. They argued that the suit actually was against the insurance
carrier rather than the parent; that in an era of compulsory liability insurance
there was little reason to continue immunity; and that allowing such suits often
would avert financial hardship and thereby promote family harmony rather
than destroy it.
Clark's views ultimately prevailed and became the law. The fact that his
arguments were prominent in a debate over half a century after they were
espoused demonstrates White's observation that "[like ancient English forms
of procedure, American judges can rule us from their graves."
20 5
C Women
Plenary evidence supports Brooks' thesis that Clark, both as a citizen and
a jurist, was a long-time, vigorous advocate for the legal equality of women.
Some of the reforms he championed were enacted in his lifetime; others have
been realized posthumously.
Clark's career-long efforts for women were characterized by a bellicose
quality that he first demonstrated in his youth.2°6 On one occasion Clark de-
manded an apology from someone who cast aspersions on his views. When no
apology was forthcoming, he challenged the perpetrator to a duel; ultimately,
however, the controversy was settled without resort to arms. 20 7 Throughout
his life Clark apparently retained this fiery characteristic; one who
"remembered [him] very vividly" described him twenty years after his death
as "a testy, temperish man.
2 08
That quality was manifest most in Clark's efforts to obtain equal legal
rights for women. 'The Justice on the bench stood at all times for the rights of
woman in the courts; and the citizen plead [sic] that woman be granted the
franchise."209 His advocacy was referred to as "his efforts to gain for woman a
larger and freer life."'2
10
The passage of women's suffrage in North Carolina has a colorful history.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 181-85. The author, then a member of the North
Carolina Senate, sponsored the legislation that partially abrogated the parent-child immunity doc-
trine. Statements herein not otherwise documented are based on his personal recollections.
205. G. WHrrE II, supra note 151, at 193.
206. Clark, however, displayed this quality far less dramatically than Stephen Field, one of
the jurists profiled in The American Judicial Tradition. See G. WHrIr, supra note 3, and text
accompanying supra note 3. While an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
Field was involved in an incident that led to the killing by his bodyguard of one of his former
colleagues on the California Supreme Court, and to the actual arrest ofthejustice himself. SeeG.
WHrrE, supra note 3, at 92-95.
207. A. BRooKs, supra note I, at 43-46; 1 THE PAPERs OF WALTER CLARK supranote 1, at 148.
208. Diary of G. Hope Chamberlain 3 (Mar. 1944) (unpublished manuscript available in
Manuscripts Department, Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina).
209. The News and Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina), May 21, 1924, at 14, col. 2.
210. Id.
19851
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Senator James L. Hyatt of Yancey County introduced the first "act to provide
for woman suffrage in North Carolina" in the 1897 General Assembly.211 The
presiding officer referred the bill to the Committee on Insane Asylums.
212
In 1920 a North Carolina Senate known to be divided evenly on the issue
debated a bill to ratify the nineteenth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. The Lieutenant Governor (later Governor), 0. Max Gardner, had an-
nounced to Clark in 1916 his support for women's suffrage, and was expected
to break the tie with a vote in favor of it.213 Before the vote was taken, how-
ever, an antisuffrage senator, Lindsay Warren (later Comptroller General of
the United States), locked a prosuffrage senator in the restroom; in that impris-
oned senator's absence, the bill was defeated by a single vote.214 North Caro-
lina ultimately ratified the amendment in 1971,21- when the significance was
purely symbolic, by a unanimous vote in both the house216 and senate.
217
Clark identified four principal sources of opposition to the suffrage move-
ment: "the liquor interest which knows that if the women vote there will be an
efficient enforcement of the Prohibition law and that will mean a money loss
to those who accumulate fortunes by making widows and orphans through the
liquor traffic"; "some large employers of labor in industrial establishments
. . . who. . . know [suffrage] means the enforcement of the Child Labor Law,
shorter hours for women and expenditures for sanitary provisions"; "political
machines which have the men more or less rounded up [and] do not think...
they can as effectively control women"; and "men of shady character who
justly fear that if women vote, the chances for obtaining office will become
. . . less for them."218 In addition to logic and history, he used humor to state
his case: "It has been said seriously that if women are allowed to vote they
211. 1897 N.C. Senate J. 295.
212. Id
213. J. MORISON, GOVERNOR 0. MAX GARDNER: A POWER IN NORTH CAROLINA AND NEW
DEAL WASHINGTON 34 (1971). Gardner's 1916 pronouncement of support to Clark evidences
Clark's identification as the principal suffrage advocate within the state's leadership. In 1911
Clark delivered the first prepared address on the subject by any state leader. A. BROOKS, spra
note 1, at 168; 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK supra note 8, at 365. His subsequent address in
1915, titled simply "Equal Suffrage" and delivered to the Equal Suffrage League, was printed and
distributed by suffrage proponents with the caption "Read and hand to some intelligent friend,
with request to read and pass on." Address by Walter Clark to Equal Suffrage League, Greens-
boro, North Carolina (Feb. 22, 1915) (unpublished address available in the North Carolina State
Library, Raleigh, North Carolina) [hereinafter cited as Greensboro Address]. He made other sig-
nificant statements on the subject in: (1) a 1916 speech titled "Ballots for Both," Address by
Walter Clark to Equal Suffrage League, Greenville, North Carolina (Dec. 8, 1916) (unpublished
address available in the North Carolina State Library, Raleigh, North Carolina) [hereinafter cited
as Greenville Address]; (2) a 1919 newspaper article titled "Votes for Women: Why and Why
Not?," Wilmington Dispatch, Feb. 22, 1919 (reprint on file in the North Carolina State Library,
Raleigh, North Carolina); and (3) a 1920 magazine article, Clark, Why North Carolina Shomld
Rlai])', EvERywomAN~'s MAGAZINE July-Aug. 1920, at 7, reprinted in Box 54 GERTRUDE WEIL
PAPERS (available in North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, North Carolina) [hereinafter cited
as Clark, EVERYWOMAN'S MAGAZINE].
214. J. MORRISON, supra note 213, at 34.
215. Act of May 6, 1971, ch. 327, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 258. The author, then a member of the
North Carolina House of Representatives, sponsored the ratification bill.
216. The house vote was 92-0. 1971 N.C. House J. 435-36.
217. The senate vote was 44-0. 1971 N.C Senate J. 370-71.
218. Clark, EvERywoM N's MAGAZINE, supra note 213, at 7.
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will vote for the handsomest man. I now understand why some politicians are
opposed to women voting.
'219
Clark viewed equal suffrage as "the logical outgrowth of [the] great demo-
cratic movement to place the Government in the hands of the people,"220 and
as "world wide in its scope and... [having] its foundation in the justice of the
demand and ... the need for the suffrage based on economic causes." 22 1 He
also viewed it as "a logical development of the movement which has elevated
women to the rights of human beings."'222 He stated:
No matter how bad a character a man has, if he can only keep out of
the penitentiary and the insane asylum we permit him to vote and to
take a share in the government, but we are afraid to trust our
mothers, wives, and daughters to give us the aid of their intelligence
and clear insight. We let the bartender and those who live upon the
evils and vices of life have a vote, while you deny it to your mothers,
your wives, your sisters, and your daughters.
223
In Clark's 1919 address to the University of North Carolina law class, he
noted "the certainty of the extension of the suffrage to women. ' 224 Although
he thus regarded suffrage as inevitable, he nevertheless worked as though he
were solely responsible for its adoption. Gertrude Weil, a leader for the suf-
frage movement in North Carolina, told Clark that he had made "the strong-
est and most complete argument for woman suffrage that [she had] seen."
225
She also called his writings on the subject "the best material available for use
in North Carolina."
226
Clark's writings also influenced the movement in other states. A Febru-
ary 3, 1919 letter to Clark from Kate Cox of the Woman's Franchise League of
Indiana states:
Your opinion has been of the greatest value. Without it we feel it
would have been almost impossible to have secured the favorable
action given the bill in this legislature. When our president . . .
asked Governor Goodrich to recommend presidential suffrage [pre-
sumably voting by women in presidential elections only] in his ad-
dress to the legislature, he stated that he would do so provided she
would secure from a lawyer well known in the state as an authority
on constitutional law the statement that the bill was constitutional in
Indiana. It seemed an impossible task, but with your material as the
basis for her argument, the opinion was secured, and presidential
suffrage was recommended in the Governor's speech at the opening
219. Greensboro Address, supra note 213, at 4.
220. Id. at 2.
221. Id at 3.
222. Id. at 7.
223. Greenville Address, supra note 214, at 1.
224. Clark, supra note 141, at 7 (emphasis added).
225. 2 THE PAPERs oF WALTER CLARK, supra note 8, at 394.
226. Id. at 403.
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session.2
27
Although North Carolina never ratified the amendment during Clark's life-
time, that failure cannot be attributed to any lack of vitality or thoroughness in
Clark's own advocacy.
Clark was sixty-five when he became the first state leader to support suf-
frage. That position as a citizen, however, evolved naturally from his career-
long effort as a jurist to liberate women from a common law that had catego-
rized them with infants, idiots, lunatics, and convicts.
228
When Clark came to the bench, the state constitution had, "in accordance
with the sentiment of a more enlightened age, abolished the common-law sys-
tem under which the property of [a] married woman became the property of
her husband on marriage. '229 "[Tihe courts[, however, had] been still slower
than the Legislature in grasping the fact of the emancipation of married wo-
men,"230 and "[n]otwithstanding this emancipation, married women still
[were] held in medieval leading strings by [the] courts. '231
Only a quarter of a century before Clark came to the supreme court, it
refused to hold a husband criminally responsible for beating his wife. Chief
Justice Pearson, generally regarded as one of the court's ablest jurists,232
stated:
A husband is responsible for the acts of his wife and he is required to
govern his household, and for that purpose, the law permits him to
use towards his wife such a degree of force, as is necessary to control
an unruly temper, and make her behave herself, and unless some
permanent injury be inflicted, or there be an excess of violence, or
such a degree of cruelty as shows that it is inflicted to gratify his own
bad passions, the law will not invade the domestic forum, or go be-
hind the curtain.23
3
The court reached this result even though the husband and wife were living
apart when the beating occurred. "The husband is still responsible for [the
wife's] acts," Pearson said, "and the marriage relation and its incidents remain
unaffected. '234
227. Letter from Kate Cox, Woman's Franchise League of Indiana, to Walter Clark (Feb. 3,
1919) (available in The Clark Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, North Carolina).
228. See Vann v. Edwards, 128 N.C. 425, 428, 39 S.E. 66, 67 (1901) (Clark, J., concurring);
Weathers v. Borders, 124 N.C. 610, 617, 32 S.E. 881, 883 (1899) (Clark, J., dissenting).
229. McCurry v. Purgason, 170 N.C. 463, 472, 87 S.E. 244, 248 (1915) (Clark, C.J.,
concurring).
230. Weathers v. Borders, 124 N.C. 610, 617, 32 S.E. 881, 884 (1899) (Clark, J., dissenting).
231. 1d. at 618, 32 S.E. at 884.
232. See supra note 1.
233. State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 262, 263 (1864).
234. Id at 264. In a similar case shortly thereafter, the court found no error in a special
verdict that a husband was "not guilty in law" for beating his wife, based on the trial judge's
optnon "that the defendant had a right to whip his wife with a switch no longer than his thumb."
State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 454 (1868). The court stated that "family government is
recognized by law as being complete in itself," and that it would "not interfere with or attempt to
control it, in favor of either husband or wife, unless in cases where permanent or malicious injury
is infficted or threatened, or the condition of the party is intolerable." Id at 456-57.
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Although the court had "advanced from that barbarism '235 before
Clark's service began, it still adhered to numerous other relics of the common
law that negatively affected women. Clark worked vigorously to eliminate
them; a common maxim of the day stated that if a woman were involved, one
could be sure that Clark would champion her cause.236 In State x Grigg,237
Clark's first opinion in a case involving a woman, the court upheld an instruc-
tion that, if a woman had had illicit intercourse prior to marriage with one
who had since become her husband, and had remained virtuous since that
occasion, she was an "innocent woman" and thus within the statute proscrib-
ing the slander of such women. Speaking for the court, Clark stated:
Every man, in the course of his life must have had instances brought
to his knowledge of unfortunate females who have at some period of
their lives been led from the path of virtue by the wiles of a seducer,
who have afterwards reformed, and by a course of exemplary con-
duct established for themselves a character for chastity above all re-
proach. Shall it be said that these unfortunates are not allowed a
locuspenitentiate, and are to be subject forever to the vile tongue of
the maligner and slanderer?
238
Grigg was the first case in Clark's consistent and tenacious campaign to
free women, particularly married women, from the residual fetters of the com-
mon law. Although generally unsuccessful in persuading the court, Clark
noted in Wallin v. Rice239 that the discriminations against married women that
he had discussed in numerous dissenting opinions24° and one concurring opin-
ion241 had been removed by statutes.242 The court, however, at times
235. State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61 (1873).
236. A. Whitener, supra note 155, at 137.
237. 104 N.C. 882, 10 S.E. 684 (1889).
238. Id. at 886, 10 S.E. at 685.
239. 170 N.C. 417, 418-20, 87 S.E. 239, 240 (1915) (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
240. Butler v. Butler, 169 N.C. 584, 594-601, 86 S.E. 507, 513-16 (1915) (Clark, C.J., dissent-
ing); Smith v. Ingram, 132 N.C. 959, 967-69, 44 S.E. 643, 646 (1915) (Clark, C.J., dissenting);
Harvey v. Johnson, 133 N.C. 353, 361-67, 45 S.E. 644, 647-49 (1903) (Clark, C.J., dissenting in
part); Walton v. Bristol, 125 N.C. 419, 426-32, 34 S.E. 544, 546-48 (1899) (Clark, J., dissenting);
Weathers v. Borders, 124 N.C. 610, 615-19, 32 S.E. 881, 883-84 (1899) (Clark. J., dissenting).
241. Ball v. Paquin, 140 N.C. 83, 96-99, 52 S.E. 410, 415-16 (1905) (Clark, Ci., concurring).
242. He named those statutes in his concurring opinion in Warren v. Dail, 170 N.C. 406,414-
15, 87 S.E. 126, 130 (1915) (Clark, CJ., concurring), as follows:
Among them may be named Rev., 2095, which provides that a married woman can draw
out her money in bank by her own check and that her husband's check will not be valid
for that purpose, as formerly; that she can be a free trader, Rev., 2112-2118; that she can
hold building and loan stock, Rev., 3885; that when a building is built or repaired on her
land with her consent or procurement she shall be deemed to have contracted for the
same, Rev., 2016; that she may sue without joining her husband when the action con-
cerns her separate property, Rev., 408; that an execution can issue against her property;
that the statute of limitations runs against her as against any other person suijuris; that
the savings from her separate estate are her separate property, Rev., 2100, that if the
husband abandons her she can sell and convey her real property as if unmarried, Rev.,
2117; that her earnings shall be her own and not subject to control of her husband, and
that compensation for any tort to her person or her property and damages for physical
and mental anguish suffered by her, she alone can recover, and without joining her hus-
band, Laws 1913, ch. 13; that if she own land for life or a longer period she shall be a
freeholder, Laws 1915, ch. 22; and many other statutes changing decisions of the courts
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thwarted Clark's efforts by not surrendering past discriminatory practices,
even when confronted with a clear legislative mandate.
In Nicholson v. Eureka Lumber Co.,243 for example, a majority of the
court recognized the validity in North Carolina of a deed acknowledged
before a woman notary in another state, even though North Carolina did not
allow women to be notaries public. Clark was related to some of the parties
and did not participate. He nevertheless appended to the opinion the follow-
ing observations.
That each State or country is sole judge of the qualifications for
voters and for office therein, and that such matter cannot be inquired
into in any other jurisdiction. In Great Britain seven times the Chief
Executive-two of them its longest and most brilliant reigns, Queen
Victoria and Queen Elizabeth-was a woman, and the same is true
even of Russia, Austria and Spain, whose most brilliant reigns were
those of Catherine the Great, Maria Theresa and Isabella.
In ten States of this country, and in many foreign nations, wo-
men have now equal suffrage with men, and usually the right of suf-
frage carries with it the right to hold office. While the women have
the full right of suffrage in only ten States of this country, they vote
in school matters and on local assessments in most of the other
States.
These are matters for each jurisdiction to settle for itself, and
when the certificate of a notary public is sent to this State from an-
other under a notarial seal, our courts cannot go back of it to inquire
into the qualifications of the officer. It may be that under our present
statute a notary public is a public office here, but "full faith and
credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other State." Const. U.S., Art. IV,
sec.1.
At common law in England, women have not only seven times
held the highest office, as Queen, regnant, but also that of Lord
Chancellor, sheriff. . . and others. Very few courts in this country
(and none in England) have held that at common law she could not
be a notary public. 24
4
Subsequently, the 1915 General Assembly expressly authorized appoint-
ment of women as notaries. 245 In State ex ret Bickelt v. Knight, however, the
court revoked the Governor's power "to appoint women as well as men to be
notaries public,"246 ignoring the fact that the position was "'deemed a place of
trust and profit and not an office.' "247 Instead, the court held that the position
was in fact an office; since the state constitution allowed only voters to hold
that had followed the ancient ideas as to the incapacity and incompetence of married
women.
243. 160 N.C. 33, 75 S.E. 730 (1912).
244. Id at 37-38, 75 S.E. at 731.
245. Act of Feb. 1, 1915, ch. 12, 1915 N.C. Pub. Laws 44.
246. State ex rel. Bickett v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333, 353, 85 S.E. 418, 428 (1915).
247. Id at 345, 85 S.E. at 424 (quoting Act of Feb. 1, 1915, ch. 12, 1915 N.C. Pub. Laws 44).
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office, and only men could vote, the act was unconstitutional.24 8
In dissent Clark stated that: no court had held the position to be an office
when the legislature had decreed otherwise;249 the court had allowed the li-
censing of women as lawyers, a far more important position;250 and whether
women could be notaries was a pure policy question for the legislature.251 He
concluded:
If the [defendant] were a man he would not be debarred from hold-
ing this appointment unless he were an idiot, a lunatic, or a convict.
The Legislature, voicing the sentiment of the people of the State,
have enacted that it is neither a crime nor a defect in this appointee
to discharge the clerical duties of a notary public because she is a
woman. Shall the Court hold that it is?252
The Knight opinion illustrates not only Clark's persistence in his cause,
but his colleagues' tenacious resistance of that position. Their resistance is
exemplified best by Justice Robert M. Douglas' statement that "[tihe wife is
legally presumed to be always under the protection of the husband, whose
stronger character renders him less liable to sinister influences, and whose
wider range of experience gives him a better knowledge of business affairs.
'25 3
Similarly, Justice William R. Allen stated that the judges opposing Clark
"recogniz[ed] the gentler qualities of woman, and [knew] how she may be in-
fluenced to her own hurt when her affections are enlisted, [and thus] deter-
mined to [rule] not for her enslavement, but for her protection. '25 4 Such
statements prompted Brooks to conclude that "the other judges, while men of
ability, were distinctly the product of a past age." 255
Clark usually responded to his colleagues' resistance by employing his
expertise in history, literature, language, and rhetoric. For example, he char-
acterized one decision of the court as
harking back to the time when a married woman not only had no
248. Id at 353, 85 S.E. at 428.
249. Id. at 356, 85 S.E. at 429 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
250. Id at 357, 85 S.E. at 430 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
251. Id at 360, 85 S.E. at 431 (Clark, CJ., dissenting).
252. Id at 363, 85 S.E. at 432 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). Earlier Clark, had lamented decisions
such as these, stating: "In England and all her colonies and in nearly every State. . ., by statute
or constitutional provision, the emancipation of. . . women has been decreed. . . .In this State
alone have the decisions of the courts failed to. . .accord with such action of the lawmaking
power." Harvey v. Johnson, 133 N.C. 353, 365, 45 S.E. 644, 648 (1903) (Clark, C. J., dissenting in
part). In a subsequent case Clark pricked further at his colleagues:
The answer in this case was sworn to before "Alleene" C. Jones, notary public. . . . If
the majority opinion in S. v. Knight. . .is to be adhered to, it must be upon the ground
that women are inherently incompetent, under the Constitution, to discharge that duty,
and hence they must have been so at the date that this answer was filed. Consequently,
the answer of the defendant not being legally verified, the allegations of the verified
complaint would be taken as true, and the discussion in the opinion of the rights of the
parties is unnecessary.
Allen v. Roanoke R.R. & Lumber Co., 171 N.C. 339, 343-44, 88 S.E. 492, 494 (1916) (Clark, C.J.,
concurring).
253. Slocomb v. Ray, 123 N.C. 571, 574, 31 S.E. 829, 830 (1898).
254. Butler v. Butler, 169 N.C. 584, 587, 86 S.E. 507, 509 (1915).
255. A. BRooKs, supra note 1, at 61.
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control over her property, but was a chattel herself, and when Shake-
speare correctly expressed the English law as to wives by making Pe-
truchio say:
"I will be master of what is my own;
She is my goods, my chattels; she is my house;
My household stuff, my field, my barn,
My horse, my ox, my ass, my anything."
256
He subsequently alluded again to "Petruchio's theory that the wife is the chat-
tel or property of her husband. 25 7
In perhaps his most piercing statement on the subject, Clark dissented
from a holding that a divorce a mensa et thoro did not sever the marital rela-
tionship so that separated spouses would hold land as tenants in common
rather than by the entirety.258 He called the effect of the decision-the hus-
band's continued entitlement to the rents and profits from the property-"un-
righteous,"259 and reiterated his complaint that, despite the fact that the
constitution conferred equal property rights on married women, "the Supreme
Court. . .has followed in every decision the former judicially created doc-
256. Walton v. Bristol, 125 N.C. 419, 429, 34 S.E. 544, 547 (1899) (Clark, J., dissenting). In
this dissent Clark also stated caustically that "[clommercial paper is sexless." Id. at 431, 34 S.E. at
548 (Clark, J., dissenting).
257. Price v. Charlotte Elec. Ry., 160 N.C. 450, 455, 76 S.E. 502, 504 (1912) (Clark, C.J,,
concurring).
In a case involving the sale of intoxicating liquor by a husband and wife, Clark stated:
If the wife acted voluntarily, she ought to be liable, whether her husband was present or
not. If she acted under his compulsion, she ought to be exempt from punishment, not
because of the marital relation, but like anyone else acting under compulsion. At com-
mon law there was a presumption that when a crime was committed by the wife in the
presence of her husband, she acted under compulsion; but that presumption does not
comport with Twentieth Century conditions. The contention that a wife has no more
intelligence or responsibility than a child is now out of date. No one believes it.
...It was as to this very presumption of the wife being under the direction of the
husband that in Oliver Twist ... Bumble, the Beadle, said: "If the law presumes that,
the law is a Ass-a idiot."
State v. Seahorn, 166 N.C. 373, 378-79, 81 S.E. 687, 689 (1914) (Clark, C.J., concurring) (quoting
C. DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST ch. 51 (1837-38)). Later, in discussing a husband's liability for the
torts of his wife, Clark again alluded to Mr. Bumble:
The common law was formulated before there was any Parliament, or when they
were enacting very few statutes. It was created by judges who were for centuries Catho-
lic priests only, and for centuries more they all were priests or laymen. It is not astonish-
ing that under the influence of priests, who presumably knew little about such matters, it
was laid down as a conclusive and irrebuttable presumption of law and fact that the wife
acted solely under compulsion of her husband, and therefore that he was liable for her
torts.
A great writer, who was far better posted on such matters, in the last century
presents that when Mr. Bumble was told that he was responsible for his wife's conduct,
and that "indeed he was the more guilty of the two in the eye of the law; for the law
supposes that your wife acts under your direction." Mr. Bumble replied: "If the law
supposes that, the law is a ass-a idiot. If that's the eye of the law, the law's a bachelor;
and the worst I wish the law is that his eye may be opened by experience."
Young v. Newsome, 180 N.C. 315, 316, 104 S.E. 660, 661 (1920) (Clark, C.J., concurring) (quoting
C. DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST ch. 51).
258. Freeman v. Belfer, 173 N.C. 581, 92 S.E. 486 (1917).
259. Id at 586, 92 S.E. at 489 (Clark, CJ., dissenting),
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trine of the inferiority of the wife and the submergence of her existence in that
of the husband .... "260 He stated:
The ruling by which a devise or conveyance of property jointly
to husband and wife becomes the sole property of the husband dur-
ing his life is without any authority in any statute here or in England,
but was created solely by men judges in the barbarous days in Eng-
land, and was the expression by them of the sentiment which still
prevails among savages, based upon their idea of the superiority of
men and the incompetence and incapacity of women, and pictured
the state of such society where men are loafers and women are
drudges doing all the work, whose results are appropriated by the
men.
2 61
If it is absolutely necessary when there is a conveyance or a devise to
a man and his wife of property jointly that one shall have the whole
of it, why should it not be the wife instead of the husband? There is
as much reason for one as for the other.
262
At a time when women are no longer disposed to submit to en-
throned wrong and to suffer in silence as their mothers did; . . .
when the irresistible tide of long delayed justice is sweeping over all
other countries as well as in ours, it is surely not an auspicious hour
by judicial construction to extend in this State the discrimination
against women to new fields where it has not heretofore obtained and
further restrict the constitutional guarantee of their personal or prop-
erty rights. 2
63
The above statements are only selective examples of Clark's numerous
protests against legally sanctioned sex discrimination. Clark's opinions, span-
ning his thirty-five years on the appellate bench, are filled with similar fervent
calls for change.
During his lifetime the legislature responded to many of Clark's recom-
mendations.264 It did not respond to others, however, until considerably later.
The law required the privy examination of married women, when executing
legal documents generally, until 1945;265 for women contracting with their
husbands, such examination was required until 1977.266 The legislature did
not eliminate the husband's entitlement to the rents and profits from entireties
property until 1982. 267 Clark had advocated all these reforms, and this advo-
260. Id at 587, 92 S.E. at 489 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 587-88, 92 S.E. at 489 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 589, 92 S.E. at 490 (Clark, CJ., dissenting).
263. Id at 589-90, 92 S.E. at 490 (Clark, CJ., dissenting).
264. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
265. The requirement was abolished by Act of Feb. 7, 1945, ch. 73, § 21, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws
84, 91.
266. The requirement was abolished by Act of May 13, 1977, ch. 375, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess.
Laws 375 (repealing former N.C. GEN STAT. § 52-6 (1966)).
267. Act of June 18, 1982, ch. 1245, § 1, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 136; Act of June 6, 1983, ch. 449,
§ 2, 1983 Adv. Legis. Serv. 102 (tax effects).
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cacy was influential long past his death.
VII. CLARK As CITIZEN AND As JURIST
The oration at Clark's funeral separated his activities on behalf of women
into those of "[tihe Justice on the bench" and those of "the citizen. ' 268 Ap-
plied generally, this dualism is not altogether accurate, for Clark's thoughts
and activities as jurist and as citizen were not always or necessarily discrete.
The categories nevertheless provide a useful, though at times inexact, frame-
work for the remainder of this profile.
A. Citizen
Clark never confined his life to his juridical duties. He managed both his
ancestral family plantation and another that his father had given him,269 and
he concerned himself with numerous subjects and endeavors. His thoughts
and activities as a citizen are too extensive to be explicated fully here. Some of
them are mentioned, however, to demonstrate his versatility.
In 1889, the year Clark joined the supreme court, Henry W. Grady, who
was famous as an advocate for a new, industrialized South, made perhaps his
best-known statement on the condition of the preindustrialized South:
I attended a funeral once in Pickens county in my State ....
They buried [the deceased] in the midst of a marble quarry: they cut
through solid marble to make his grave; and yet a little tombstone
they put above him was from Vermont. They buried him in the
heart of a pine forest, and yet the pine coffin was imported from Cin-
cinnati. They buried him within touch of an iron mine, and yet the
nails in his coffin and the iron in the shovel that dug his grave were
imported from Pittsburg [sic]. They buried him by the side of the
best sheep-grazing country on the earth, and yet the wool in the cof-
fin bands and the coffin bands themselves were brought from the
North. The South didn't furnish a thing on earth for that funeral but
the corpse and the hole in the ground. There they put him away and
the clods rattled down on his coffin, and they buried him in a New
York coat and a Boston pair of shoes and a pair of breeches from
Chicago and a shirt from Cincinnati, leaving him nothing to carry
into the next world with him to remind him of the country in which
he lived, and for which he fought for four years, but the chill of
blood in his veins and the marrow in his bones.2
70
Almost a quarter of a century before Grady's speech, in the immediate
aftermath of the Civil War, a nineteen-year-old Clark had written much the
same:
268. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
269. A. BRooKs, supra note 1, at 35-36, 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at
189-90.




Our magnificent country is unimproved, our factories unbuilt, our
wants supplied from without .... From the inkstand from which I
write and the pen with which I trace these lines, to the printing press
on which they are promulgated, from the cradle in which we are
rocked and the carved bedstead on which we repose, to the coffin that
will receive us at our death, and the tombstone that shall commemo-
rate our virtues to the succeeding generation, there is but little of the
comforts or conveniences, and few even of the necessaries of life for
which we are not indebted to that same universal Yankee nation.
The very cotton that whitens our fields must pass through Yankee
looms before it adorns our belles or clothes our laborers.271
This penchant for writing that Clark displayed in youth endured through-
out his life. As citizen and jurist, he produced prolific writings on a variety of
subjects.272 He wrote many articles advocating reform,273 as well as items
relating primarily to law, government, history, and agriculture, that were pub-
lished in such magazines as The Green Bag, The Arena, Harper's, and the
American Law Review.274 The editor of the American Law Review wrote to
him: "We welcome anything from your pen.
'275
From 1909 to 1913, Josephus Daniels published the North Carolina Re-
view, a literary and historical journal.276 In 1911 Clark wrote for the Review
on the "Tercentenary of the Translation of the Authorized English Version of
the Bible." 277 He also compiled a five-volume history of the regiments and
battalions from North Carolina in the Civil War,278 compiled a sixteen-vol-
ume set of the State Records of North Carolina,279 composed and secured
legislative adoption of the North Carolina state motto, esse quam videri ("to be
rather than to seem"), 280 and with his wife, an accomplished French scholar,
translated into English Constant's three-volume history of the life of
Napoleon.
28'
A long-time trustee of Trinity College, the predecessor to Duke Univer-
sity,282 Clark actively associated himself with academia for most of his life. A
history of Trinity and Duke describes him as "a trustee after 1890 and a man
of some scholarly interests. '283 He was nominated to be president of Trinity
in 1894, but "declined to run."
284
271. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note I, at 159-60.
272. See A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 257-65 (selected list of Clark's writings).
273. Id. at 67.
274. See id. at 257-65.
275. Id. at 66; 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 239.
276. J. MORRISON, JOSEPHUS DANIELS SAYS.. . AN EDrroR'S POLITICAL ODYSSEY FROM
BRYAN TO WILSON AND F.D.R., 1894-1913, at 197-98 (1962).
277. Id
278. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 239, 247.
279. Id. at 66, 247.
280. Id at 160.
281. Id at 66, 247.
282. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 239.
283. E. PORTER, TRINITY AND Du'KE 1892-1924: FOUNDATIONS OF DUKE UNIVERSITY 15
(1964).
284. Id at 51.
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The trustees of the University of North Carolina also offered Clark the
presidency of their institution, and Wake Forest College asked him to be its
law school dean.285 He delivered several commencement addresses, and re-
ceived an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from the University of North
Carolina.2
86
Clark lived during the "progressive era" and associated with many signifi-
cant proponents of "progressive" thought and action. A 1909 letter from Sen-
ator Lee S. Overman287 advised Clark that Senator Robert M. LaFollette, a
leading progressive, had referred to Clark as "the great Chief Justice of North
Carolina" and had "passed the highest encomium upon [Clark] that [Over-
man] ever heard passed upon any man."288 LaFollette himself wrote in
1916,289 as did Louis Brandeis,290 to thank Clark for supporting Brandeis'
nomination to the United States Supreme Court.
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Samuel Gompers, William Jen-
nings Bryan,291 Gifford Pinchot,292 Upton Sinclair,293 and other national
figures of the progressive era also corresponded with Clark.294 Further, Clark
communicated with virtually every prominent leader in North Carolina re-
garding issues of prevailing public interest.
295
Clark both influenced, and was influenced by, the social and political
thought of the progressive movement. He has been described as "always
steadfast in his advocacy of advanced progressive reform and a radically de-
mocratized Constitution."296 His "sympathies and interests were always en-
listed in behalf of the laboring classes."'297 Apparently, if a matter involved a
corporation, lawyers expected him to be against the corporation. 298 Labor, he
wrote, "is the basis of civilization. Let it withhold its hand and the forests
285. A. BRooKs, supra note 1, at 65.
286. Id at 65.
287. United States Seator from North Carolina, 1903-30. 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK,
stqra note 8, at 75.
288. Id. at 99.
289. Id at 291-92.
290. Id at 296.
291. William Jennings Bryan wrote to Clark on January 7, 1913: "I need not assure you that I
appreciate your long devotion to the progressive cause, and that I regret that you are not in posi-
tion to make a larger contribution to the public than you can in the position which you now
occupy." Letter from William Jennings Bryan to Walter Clark (Jan. 7, 1913) in Clark Manu-
scripts, Vol. V, at 615 (available in North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, North Carolina).
292. Gifford Pinchot, a leading conservationist, wrote in 1917 to advise Clark that he had been
elected director of the National Conservation Association. 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK,
supra note 8, at 338-39.
293. Clark corresponded with novelist Upton Sinclair in 1922, writing that "[tIhe Corporations
seem determined to crush labor." Id at 437. He decried the Rockefellers' accumulation of
wealth, and advocated government ownership of railroads, telegraphs, telephones, coal mines,
water power, and "other Monopolies." Id. Sinclair wrote Clark a few weeks later requesting
information on "the activities of the Fundamentalists in the Southern Colleges." Id, at 443-44.
294. Id at 365.
295. Id at 365.
296. Paul, Legal Progressivivsm. the Courts, andthe Crisis fthe 1890"s, 33 Bus, HIST. Ray. 495,
508 n.61 (1959).
297. A. Whitener, supra note 155, at 36.
298. Id at 137.
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return and the grass grows in the silent streets. '299
Clark forcefully advocated a workers' compensation system. His judicial
opinions manifest his sympathy for employees injured in the workplace,3°°
and as citizen he spoke for legislative intervention on their behalf.301 He de-
rided the conventional system as pitting "poor and needy plaintiffs against an
influential company. . . at a serious disadvantage to the plaintiff," and urged
instead payment of "a fixed rate of compensation for these injuries. . . with-
out litigation and, therefore, without deduction for counsel fees, and that it...
not be open to the corporation to defend upon the ground either that it was not
negligent or that the plaintiff was negligent. '302
Although Clark dealt sternly with criminal offenders as a trial judge
303
and supreme court justice,3°4 he also advocated humane treatment of prison-
ers. As jurist, when confronted with a record of "unprintable evidence of bru-
tality, almost beyond conception, ' 30 5 he berated the practice of flogging
convicts. The State, in his view, had a responsibility to protect prisoners from
violence. "Nothing less than this can be tolerated in the treatment of these
unfortunates by a Christian, civilized people.'' 3°6 He further stated that "[tihe
growing humanity of the age demands that punishment for crime, however
justly inflicted, should be humanely administered, with due regard to the
rights of the prisoner." 30 7 As citizen, he urged the enactment of legislation to
provide public support for "dependent families of person[s] undergoing
imprisonment." 3
08
Clark envisioned a utopian society evolving from the reforms he champi-
oned. He prophesied:
that every village will be connected with its neighbor by electric
roads, for steam will have ceased to be a motive power; that educa-
tion will be universal and poverty unknown; that every swamp will
have been drained to become the seat of happy homes; that every
river will be deepened and straightened; that public works operated
for the benefit of the people and not for the enrichment of a few, will
bring comforts and conveniences, now unknown, to the most distant
299. Pressly v. Yarn Mills, 138 N.C. 410, 424, 51 S.E. 69, 75 (1905) (Clark, C. J., concurring).
Cf. W. J. Bryan, Cross of Gold Speech (1896), reprinted in WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN: SELEC-
TIONS 46 (R. Ginger ed. 1967) ("Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will
spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our farms and the grass will grow in the streets of every
city in the country.").
300. See, e.g., Stewart v. Raleigh & Augusta Air Line R. Co., 137 N.C. 688,50 S.E. 312 (1905);
Greenlee v. Southern Ry., 122 N.C. 977, 30 S.E. 115 (1898).
301. E.g., Labor Day Address by Judge Clark, Wilmington, North Carolina (Sept. 7, 1914),
quoted in A. Whitener, supra note 155, at 37-38.
302. Id.
303. A. BRooKs, supra note 1, at 56-59; see also Winston, supra note 15, at 184.
304. A. BRooKs, supra note 1, at 62-63.
305. State v. Mincher, 172 N.C. 895, 901-02, 90 S.E. 429, 432 (1916) (Clark, C.J., concurring).
306. Id. at 902, 90 S.E. at 432.
307. State v. Nipper, 166 N.C. 272, 275-76, 81 S.E. 164, 166 (1914).
308. Letter from Lucius V. Basset to Walter Clark (Feb. 17, 1916) (available in The Clark
Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, North Carolina) (indicating Clark advocated
such legislation).
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fireside; that the hours of labor will be shortened; that the toil of
agriculture will be done by machinery and that irrigation will have
banished droughts; that the advance of medicine, already the most
progressive science among us, will have practically abolished all dis-
eases save that of old age; that simple laws and an elevated and all-
powerful public opinion will have minimized crime and reduced the
volume of litigation; that religion less sectarian and disputatious
about creeds and forms will be a practical exemplification of that
love of fellow man which was typified by its divine founder; that
every toiler with brains or with hand will prosper; and that under
juster laws the only inequality in wealth or condition will be that due
to the difference in the energy, efforts and natural gifts of each
possessor.3
9
Although this vision was patently naive in some respects, it since has been
fulfilled in others.
B. Jurist
Clark's contribution as jurist is voluminous. During his 35 supreme court
years he wrote 3,235 opinions, of which 182 were concurring and 371 were
dissenting.310 His long judicial career, with its countless expositions and en-
deavors, cannot be detailed fully here. This profile thus concludes with a nec-
essarily truncated version of those experiences.
Brooks asserts that "Clark was the first jurist in America to employ exten-
sively the technique of writing dissenting opinions, bolstering his arguments
with documented extra-legal matters, such as government bureau reports, sta-
tistics, scientific discoveries, and occasionally reports of American Bar Associ-
ation committees."'311 Whether Clark actually originated this practice may be
questioned; clearly, however, he relied extensively on such materials, and his
opinions abound with references to them.312 Thus, he preceded Justice Tray-
nor in believing that judges "could inform themselves on matters beyond the
facts of a particular case, and, when reliable data were lacking, 'construct...
environmental assumptions.' "313
Clark's opinions also are filled with historical and literary references. Sir
Walter Scott, in Guy Mannering, states that "[a] lawyer without history or liter-
309. A. BRooKs, supra note I, at 148-49.
310. Id. at 63.
311. Id at 63-64.
312. See, e.g., Cheek v. Lumber Co., 134 N.C. 225, 231-32, 47 S.E. 400, 400-01 (1904) (Clark,
C.J., concurring). In this opinion Clark cited U.S. Consular Reports to describe a device used on
European railroads to prevent fires caused by locomotive sparks. The opinion demonstrates that
Clark was well read and was something of a scientist.
Another illustration of Clark's use of materials not of record is Mayo v. Town of Washington,
122 N.C. 5, 17-30, 29 S.E. 343, 346-51 (1898) (Clark, J., dissenting). In that case, the majority held
that the erection and operation of an electric plant for lighting streets was not a necessary munici-
pal expense; Clark dissented, citing the modem need for electricity and its increasing use by mu-
mcipalities in other parts of the world. Id A unanimous court subsequently adopted the view
that Clark expressed in Mayo. Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N.C. 125, 45 S.E. 1029 (1903).
313. G. WHrra, supra note 3, at 304.
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ature is a mechanic, a mere working mason; if he possesses some knowledge of
these, he may venture to call himself an architect." 314 Clark, by this standard,
was preeminently an architect. He began studying history and literature as a
youth in his father's large private library315 and continued the study through-
out his years. As a result, he knew the classics thoroughly and referred to
them repeatedly, in both his legal opinions and his public articulations.
As chief justice, Clark had an aptitude for organization and efficient dis-
position of cases.316 Although modem chief justices generally carry a dimin-
ished caseload to allow time for administrative duties, Clark did not. Rather,
he often wrote the difficult opinions, or assisted others in writing them.
317
Clark introduced the doctrine of last clear chance into North Carolina
jurisprudence to mitigate the often harsh results of contributory negligence
findings. In Smith v. Norfolk & Southern Railroad318 a train had killed plain-
tiff's decedent, who, while intoxicated, had fallen asleep with his head on a
railroad track. The trial court instructed, in effect, on last clear chance, and
the supreme court, refusing to adopt the doctrine, awarded a new trial princi-
pally because of that instruction. Clark dissented, stating:
[T]he negligence of the man does not authorize the engineer to kill or
cripple him and if, after discovery of his helpless condition, when
made in time to avoid injury, the man is killed or crippled, such kill-
ing or crippling is wanton or reckless, and the company is liable,
though of course, the negligence of the party on the track continues
up to the very moment of the impact. . . . This is common sense
and justice. It can never be made a part of the law of the land that
these Goliaths of mechanism can kill or crush whatever they shall
find in their path. . . . The failure of one in charge of so powerful,
dangerous and rapidly moving a machine to keep a proper lookout is
recklessness which makes the company liable whenever the jury find
that, by a proper lookout, the helpless man could have been discov-
ered in time to avoid killing him. Human life is worth that much
consideration if it is worth anything.
3 19
Six years later, in Arrowood v. South Carolina & Georgia Extension Rail-
way,320 Clark wrote for a unanimous court upholding a verdict for plaintiff
that was based on the last clear chance doctrine. He stated:
[N]otwithstanding a human being is down helpless on the track, and
is there in his own wrong, the railroad company acquires no right to
run over and kill him for his foolhardiness if by ordinary care it can
be avoided. Even a cow or a hog does not forfeit its life under such
circumstances, if the company's servants can by ordinary care avoid
killing. If... defective lookout caused the killing which might
314. W. ScoTT, Guy MANNERING 251 (1829) in Scors'S WAvERLY NOVELS (Boston ed.).
315. See Note, supra note 13.
316. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 158.
317. Id. at 159.
318. 114 N.C. 728, 19 S.E. 863 (1894).
319. Id at 767, 19 S.E. at 871-72 (Clark, J., dissenting).
320. 126 N.C. 629, 36 S.E. 151 (1900).
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otherwise have been prevented, then, notwithstanding the negligence
of the deceased, the defective lookout kept by the defendant was the
proximate cause of the death.
32'
Clark also introduced the tort of negligent infliction of mental anguish or
emotional distress into North Carolina jurisprudence. In Young V. Western
Union Telegraph Co.322 Western Union waited for eight days to deliver a tele-
gram reading, "Come in haste. Your wife is at the point of death. ' 323 The
addressee's business had been located near the Western Union Office for many
years. Because the telegram was delivered late, plaintiff did not know of his
wife's death and burial.
The court held that the addressee could maintain an action against the
company and recover for mental pain and anguish, even though there was no
accompanying physical injury. Clark wrote:
The difficulty of measuring damages to the feelings is very great, but
the admeasurement is submitted to the jury in many other instances,
. ..and it is better it should be left to them. . . than, on account of
such difficulty, to require parties injured in their feelings by the neg-
ligence, the malice or wantonness of others, to go without remedy.
324
In addition to his formal opinions, Clark made numerous other contribu-
tions to the judiciary and the legal system. He rewrote the rules of practice so
that the courts could move their dockets efficiently. 325 He encouraged and
accelerated the building of an efficient, modern library for the supreme
court326 and "drew heavily" on its resources in his own work.327 He instituted
the practice that continues today of presenting portraits of deceased justices to
be hung in the courtroom and halls of the supreme court building;328 he re-
corded the history of the supreme court, both the institution and biographies
of its members; 329 he solicited funds for the statue of Thomas Ruffin that
stands at the entrance to the Court of Appeals Building;330 and he made the
321. Id at 633-34, 36 SE. at 153.
322. 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890).
323. Id. at 370, 11 S.E. 1044.
324. Id at 385-86, 11 S.E. at 1049. In Meadows v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 132 N.C.
40, 43 S.E. 512 (1903), with Clark writing the opinion, the court reaffirmed the Young doctrine in
the limited context of telegraph companies.
When Clark ran for chief justice in 1902, the railroad interests, which considered him an
irreconcilable enemy, attempted to use this decision against him. An official of one railroad wrote
an open letter to a newspaper, stating: "To suffer mental anguish is the frequent lot of mortals
here below. Judge Clark has found out that it is convertible into money. ... I want to know
how much money for a given amount of anguish." H. PAGE, SOME CAMPAIGN LETrERS 15
(1902). He closed by stating that the corporations had good reason to view Clark as a danger. Id.
at 15-17.
325. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 61.
326. Id at 159-60.
327. A note to this effect is appended on the opening page of the copy of I THE PAPERS OF
WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, available at the North Carolina Supreme Court Library, Raleigh,
North Carolina.
328. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 160.
329. Clark, The Supreme Court of North Carolina, 4 THE GREEN BAG 457, 521, 569 (1892),
reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 505-85.
330. A. BRooKS, supra note 1, at 159. Moving the statue to the mall area between the Justice
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principal address at the statue's unveiling and presentation to the State.331
Clark edited and annotated the reprints of the North Carolina Reports, a
task described as "immense. . .and of great value to the State and the legal]
profession." 332 White notes that Justice John Harlan(II), in certain instances,
"was prepared to accept a role for judges as glossators. ' 333 Clark, however, in
his editing of the Reports, reputedly went beyond merely glossing. He is be-
lieved not only to have edited, but actually to have rewritten opinions to read
as he thought they should.334 Supposedly, Justice Clifton L. Moore, who
served on the supreme court from 1959 to 1966, refused to rely on opinions as
reported in the volumes Clark edited, but instead used originals from the
court's files?3
35
Clark's rewriting of opinions perhaps can be attributed to his view of pre-
cedent. He did not consider a matter settled until it was settled correctly, in
accordance with his point of view. Thus, precedent was not binding unless it
was "right," and it was not "right" unless it addressed current social condi-
tions. Clark would disregard even recent precedent if policy arguments, sup-
ported by statistics and developing science, so mandated. He stated that, to
depart from precedent, "the Court, in response to the sentiment of a more
enlightened and juster age, would need no authority further than to say, 'We
have advancedfrom that barbarism."336 Such a view is not uncommon; jurists
such as Judge Lemuel Shaw,337 Judge Charles Doe,338 and Justice Robert
Jackson339 made similar statements.
In a law review article, Clark criticized the tendency to rely on precedent,
stating that it retarded the progress of the law. He wrote:
In all the other professions, in the sciences and arts, there has been
...progress. In the one calling of the law, for which we claim espe-
cial ability for the average of its membership, many doctrines remain
as they were when patients were bled to death and heretics were
burnt.34
o
Building and Court of Appeals Building has been considered. The News and Observer (Raleigh,
North Carolina), Feb. 2, 1984, at C2, coLl; id., Jan. 28, 1984, at Cl, col. 1.
331. See Addresses at the Unveiling and Presentation to the State of the Statue of Thomas
Ruffin 7-23 (Feb. 1, 1915) (available in North Carolina State Library, Raleigh, North Carolina).
332. Note, supra note 13, at 227.
333. G. WHrrE, supra note 3, at 354.
334. No written, documented evidence of Clark's rewriting of reported opinions has been
found. There are enough verbal accounts, however, to render the story credible. See, e.g., infra
note 335 and accompanying text.
335. Comment by David M. Britt, retired Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, to the
author, Raleigh, North Carolina (Aug. 16, 1983).
336. State v. Mincher, 172 N.C. 895, 904, 90 S.E. 429, 433 (1916) (Clark, C.J., concurring).
337. G. WHITE, supra note 3, at 60 (stating that 'Judges had a good deal of freedom to modify
precedents in the light of changed circumstances, extracting their principles and reasoning by
analogy, but little freedom to modify the decisions of legislators.').
338. Id at 123 (stating that he "regarded precedents. . . as simply evidence of the current
state of the law, having no particular persuasive value.").
339. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 639-40 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(Jackson, writing many years after Clark, stated: "I see no reason why I should be consciously
wrong today because I was unconsciously wrong yesterday.").
340. Clark, Some Myths of the Law, 13 MICH. L. REv. 26, 26 (1914).
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He considered Blackstone's characterization of the common law as "[t]he
perfection of reason" to be inapt.3 4 1 "This claim is absolutely without founda-
tion and all progress in the law has consisted in getting away from the barba-
rous teachings, of the common law. In its origin, and in its continuance, this
was merely judge-made law based upon alleged customs or traditions among a
barbarous people.
'342
Clark's opinions include similar expressions. In Pressy v. Yarn Mills he
stated: 'The law is not fossilized. It is a growth. It grows more just with the
growing humanity of the age and broadens 'with the process of the suns.' -1343
He also wrote: "'The reason of the law is the life thereof,' and 'when the
reason ceases, the law ceases.' These two rules are well recognized by sound
common sense and must be observed to save the law from degenerating into
mere technicality.
3 "44
Clark also emphasized this theme in public addresses, saying of Ruffin:
"While he had due regard for precedent he was great enough not to be ham-
pered by them [sic] in reaching a just conclusion. He realized that the object
of the administration of justice is to do justice." 345 A court's opinion, Clark
explained, should be viewed in the context of the times. Ruffin's opinion in
Hoke v. Henderson,346 which Clark had worked to overturn, "should be
judged from the standpoint of the times in which [Ruffin] labored and not by
the view of the present day."'347 It was overruled because "it had become out
of line with the thoughts and the needs of a new generation, and the Constitu-
341. Id at 27.
342. Id Clark further posits:
The origin of the common law has been fictitiously claimed to be "as undiscoverable
as the sources of the Nile." The sources of the Nile have now long since been discovered
and as to the common law we know that its real origin was in the customs of our barba-
rous and semi-barbarous ancestors, added to by the decisions of Judges of more recent
centuries, most of whom were neither wise nor learned beyond their age. One of these,
in haste to get to his supper, or half comprehending the cause, or prejudiced, it may be,
against a suitor, or possibly boozy (and such have been kenned) has rendered a decision,
another Judge too indifferent, or unable, to think for himself, or oppressed by the magic
of a precedent, has followed, other judges have followed each other in turn and thus
many indifferent decisions being interwoven with perhaps a greater number of sound
ones, there was built up, piece by piece, precedent by precedent, that fabric of law, that
patchwork of many hands, that conception of divers and diverse minds, created at differ-
ent times, that jumble of absurdities, consistent only in inconsistency, which those who
throve by exploiting its mysteries were wont to style "the perfection of human reason-
the Common law of England." As a system, it resembles OTWAY'S Old Woman whose
patched gown of many colors bespoke "Variety of wretchedness."
Id at 27-28.
343. Pressly v. Yarn Mills, 138 N.C. 410, 424, 51 S.E. 69, 74 (1905) (Clark, C.J., concurring).
Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Chief Justice Warren's statement that the meaning of
the eighth amendment can change with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.").
344. Wilson Lumber & Milling Co. v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 159 N.C. 445,448,74 S.E.
1056, 1057 (1912) (Clark, CJ., dissenting).
345. Addresses at the Unveiling and Presentation to the State of the Statue of Thomas Ruffin,
supra note 331, at 15.
346. 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833).
347. Addresses at the Unveiling and Presentation to the State of the Statue of Thomas Ruflin,
su.lra note 331, at 18.
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tion, as we now understand its spirit. '348
Other jurists of Clark's time shared his concern that the common law was
not responding to contemporary problems. Roscoe Pound wrote of these
judges: "Today, for the first time,. . . instead of securing... what they most
prize, they know [the common law] chiefly as something that stands between
them and what they desire."349 Frank Doster, populist chief justice of the
Kansas Supreme Court (1897-1903), for example, also took liberties with pre-
cedent. Doster, however, felt compelled to defend his action as a return to,
rather than a departure from, the "true" common law. He stated:
Many of the recent decisions have been along lines of new legal de-
parture, extorted from the courts by the capitalistic institutions of the
country. If I have any views at all different from that of everybody
else it is that we need a return to the old ways and the old common
law precedents. They will be found more consonant with theories of
popular right at least.3
50
Clark felt no such compunction to traditionalize his position. At a time
when courts clung tightly to precedent, he was remarkably candid in assailing
it. "[N]o judge or court is bound by an erroneous precedent," he stated un-
equivocally, "but should correct it.'" 3
51
Clark perhaps best demonstrated his unfettered approach to precedent in
the overruling of Hoke v. Henderson.352 Defendant in Hoke had been ap-
pointed clerk of a county court pursuant to an 1806 statute. Prior to expiration
of his term, the legislature established a new method of selecting clerks. Plain-
tiff had been elected clerk pursuant to the later statute. His motion to qualify
and assume the office was disallowed by the trial court, and in a lengthy opin-
ion by Chief Justice Ruffin the supreme court affirmed.353 Clark subsequently
stated the ratio decidendi of Hoke, "that [the] office is not an agency, but prop-
erty obtained by contract, and therefore protected by the contract clause of the
Federal Constitution."
354
In Walser ex rel Wilson v. Jordan35 5 the court relied on Hoke in retaining
incumbent judicial officials and ignoring legislation to reform the courts.
Clark, in dissent, did not mention Hoke, but simply stated that "[t]he emolu-
ments of such officeholders cannot be more sacred than the right of the people
to control their own government, and to change the management of their own
property whenever they think proper."356
348. Id at 21.
349. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 18 THE GREEN BAG 17, 19 (1906), quoted in
Auman, Some Problems of American Legal Development During the Period of Indystrial Growth,
1865-1900, 12 U. CIN. L. Rlv. 519, 543 n.49 (1938).
350. M. BRODHEAD, PERSEVERING POPULIST, THE LIFE OF FRANK DOSTER 102 (1969).
351. Freeman v. Belfer, 173 N.C. 581, 586, 92 S.E. 486, 489 (1917) (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
352. 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833).
353. Id. at 31.
354. Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131, 163, 46 S.E. 961, 972 (1903) (Clark, C.J., concurring).
355. 124 N.C. 683, 33 S.E. 139 (1899).
356. Id at 706, 33 S.E. at 151 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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Four years later, in Mial v. Ellington,357 a majority of the court adopted
Clark's position and overruled Hoke. The majority opinion, however, was
crafted carefully in traditional terms. It expounded at length on foreign prece-
dents contrary to Hoke, and demonstrated the court's trepidation in overruling
its own precedent:
We recognize the gravity of the proposition that we shall reverse
a decision of this Court, delivered by Chief Justice Ruffin, with the
approval of Justices Daniel and Gaston, which we concede has re-
ceived the unanimous approval of this Court in a number of cases,
and a majority thereof in many others. If this were a question in-
volving the title to property, upon the decision of which property
rights have been acquired, settlements have been made, and the se-
curity and peace of families was dependent, we should feel it our
duty to leave it to the legislative department of the government to
bring the law into harmony with sound principle and the best
thought and experience of the age in which we live. Being, however,
a question of public constitutional law, involving the sovereignty of
the State, if it is made to appear that the principle upon which Hoke
v. Henderson is founded stands without support in reason and is op-
posed to the uniform, unbroken current of authority in both State
and Federal courts, it becomes our duty to overrule it and place our
jurisprudence in line with that of the other States and the Federal
Government. 3
58
The majority opinion exemplifies what Karl Llewellyn describes as the
"Formal Style" of dealing with precedent, in which the court virtually denies
its ability to make law.359 Justice Robert M. Douglas, dissenting in Mal, was
even more cautious. He stated:
I know it is said that even Homer sometimes nods, but I never
heard of his going to sleep and continuing in a profound slumber for
seventy years. It remained for the courts of North Carolina to take
this more than Rip Van Winkle nap, and as we wake up we may well
ask where are Ruffin and Daniel and Gaston and Pearson? Gone!
And we who sit in the ever-widening shadow of their fame are asked
to say that they knew not whereof they spoke! Let this be said by
those who may-it shall not come from me.3 60
Clark's concurrence contrasts sharply with these timorous opinions. He
noted that "[t]he Court that decided Hoke v. Henderson did not deem them-
selves infallible, for they overruled divers of their opinions as erroneous, and
succeeding Courts have overruled other opinions of that Court. There is no
peculiar sacredness attached to Hoke v. Henderson. '361 Clark then traced the
subsequent history of Hoke and concluded that "the doctrine of private prop-
erty in public office, started on its course by the decision in Hoke v. Henderson,
357. 134 N.C. 131, 46 S.E. 961 (1903).
358. Id at 139, 46 S.E. at 963-64.
359. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrroN: DECIDINO APPEALS 38, 73 (1960).
360. Mial, 134 N.C. at 179, 46 S.E. at 977 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
361. Id at 162, 46 S.E. at 971-72 (Clark, CJ., concurring).
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will, like the ghost in Hamlet, 'no longer walk the earth' to disquiet the
peace." 3
62
Clark also believed that the doctrine of judicial review had no legitimate
basis in our jurisprudence.363 On several occasions the Constitutional Con-
vention had rejected a proposal that judges pass on the constitutionality of acts
of Congress.364 Thus, according to Clark, "[tihe subsequent action of the
Supreme Court in assuming the power. . . was without a line in the constitu-
tion to authorize it, either expressly or by implication";365 the doctrine was a
"myth," 366 and had "no validity apart from the acquiescence or toleration
which has been accorded it."
367
Clark thought it "inconceivable that the veto power should have been
given the judiciary, when it had never existed elsewhere, without any word or
line intimating the conferring [of] such.. . and with no provision for its being
overruled as in the case of the executive veto. ' 368 The constitutionality of a
law, in his view, was "for the legislative body which passes it."369 He shared
Justice Holmes' belief that "[tihe judiciary, not being elected representatives of
the majority, was [not] to substitute its views for those of the legislatures."
370
"They are the direct agents of the people and always have in their ranks more
intelligence than the highest court of the State or nation .... ,,371
Nothing can be more dangerous than to assume that the law-making
authority . . . does not rest with the representatives of the people[,]
subject to review by the people alone at the next election[,] but that
the majority of a board of five, or of nine, lawyers can nullify at will
the power of the people.3
72
He saw an "immense liability to abuse of this irresponsible power assumed by
the judiciary, without any express constitutional warrant, to nullify and set at
naught the will of the people as expressed through their constitutional organs,
their Legislatures and Congress."
373
Clark apparently believed that the doctrine of judicial review would not
survive. "[B]eing. . .without constitutional warrant," he wrote, "every exten-
sion jeopardizes its extinction.
'3 74
362. Id at 167, 46 S.E. at 973 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
363. E.g., Clark, Some Defects of the Constitution of the United States, Address to the Law
Department of the University of Pennsylvania (Apr. 27, 1906), reprinted in Clark, spra note 329 at
26; 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 8, at 553-72.
364. 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 8, at 563-65.
365. Id at 564.
366. Clark, supra note 340, at 30.
367. Id at 31.
368. Id
369. Id at 30.
370. G. WHIrrE, supra note 3, at 159.
371. Clark, supra note 340, at 30.
372. Id at 31.
373. Walser ex rel Wilson v. Jordan, 124 N.C. 683, 703, 33 S.E. 139, 150 (1899) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
374. Id at 704, 33 S.E. at 151.
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We have never given to the judges the "judicial veto" power. It has
been assumed, but it can not be maintained. It makes of the courts
small legislative bodies which may be appointed, or nominated, by
the special interests. The question then is squarely presented which
shall control-the "interests" or the body of the people? One must
know little of the temper of the American people if he believes that
this myth can long survive the fierce light that is being shed upon
it.375
Despite his opposition, however, the "myth" persists.
Clark, as jurist, cannot be classified into a singular category of legal
thought. His repeated appeals to inherent justness, fairness, or rightness reflect
a natural-law philosophy similar to that expressed by Cicero.
376
According to Cicero, however, natural law was "unchanging and everlast-
ing," not "different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in
the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law. . . valid for all nations and
all times. '377 In this aspect Clark's philosophy differed, being similar to
Holmes' belief "that law responds to unconscious and changing majoritarian
impulses, so that it can never be static. '378 Clark stated that "[elvery age
should have laws based upon its own intelligence and expressing its own ideas
of right and wrong. Progress and betterment should not be denied... by the
dead hand of the Past."'379
Natural-law philosophy also led to the oracular theory of judging, a con-
cept of law "as a mystical body of permanent truths, and the judge... as one
who declared what those truths were and made them intelligible-as an oracle
who 'found' and interpreted the law."'380 Clark also expressly rejected this
theory. "The fiction that the judges declared the 'common law,' and did not
make it," he said, "is a mere decency."
381
Brooks reduced Clark's philosophy of law to the pithy maxim that "[t]he
public welfare is the supreme law."'38 2 He traces this philosophy to Jeremy
Bentham, "the common law['s]. . . severest critic,"' 383 and depicts Clark as a
Bentham disciple.384 "Bentham was fundamentally a positivist whose betes
noires were natural law and metaphysics. . .. "385 Although Clark may have
subscribed to Bentham's utilitarian principle of "the greatest happiness of the
375. Clark, supra note 340, at 30.
376. Cicero stated that "we are born for Justice, and.., right is based, not upon men's opin-
ion, but upon nature." DE LEGIBus, Book I. X. 28-30, reprinted in CICERO, Da RE PUDLICA, D
LEGIHUs 329 (C.W. Keyes trans. 1928).
377. DE RE PUBLICA, Book III. XXII. 33, reprinted in CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, DE LEOIBUS
211 (C.W. Keyes trans. 1928).
378. G. WHrrE II, supra note 151, at 65.
379. Price v. Charlotte Elec. Ry. Co., 160 N.C. 367, 372, 76 S.E. 502, 505 (1912) (Clark, C.J.,
concurring).
380. G. WHrrE, supra note 3, at 2.
381. Price v. Charlotte Elec. Ry. Co., 160 N.C. 367, 372, 76 S.E. 502, 504 (1912) (Clark, C.J.,
concurring).
382. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 79-80.
383. Orth, Jeremy Benthanz" The Common Law'r Severest Critic, 68 A.B.A. J. 710 (1982).
384. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 80-84.
385. L. LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 81 (4th ed. 1979).
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greatest number,"386 he did not depart as readily from "natural law and meta-
physics" as did Bentham. Benthan, for example, was the harbinger of Aus-
tinian positivism, 387 one aspect of which was a "rigid separation of law and
morals."388 Clark, on the other hand, shared Earl Warren's "conception of
law as inexorably linked with ethics.
'389
Clark's view appears to combine natural law with positivism. Sociologi-
cal jurisprudence, however, also figures in his philosophy. Before Pound ex-
posed and expounded on the "mechanical jurisprudence .. . in which
conceptions [were] developed logically at the expense of practical results and
in which the artificiality characteristic of legal reasoning [was] exagger-
ated," 390 Clark had rejected it. Instead, he advocated "the adjustment of prin-
ciples and doctrines to the human conditions they are to govern rather than to
assumed first principles." 391 He used both legal and extra-legal materials,
392
within or without the record, to educate himself on the human conditions gov-
erned by his decisions--to create "an awareness of the social context of
adjudication." 393
Finally, in this regard, Clark shared with the realists "a conception of law
in flux." 394 Although he denounced the "judicial creation of law," another
tenet of realism, 395 he embodied it. He epitomized Jerome Frank's statement
that "the personality of the judge is the pivotal factor in law administration,
[and thus] law may vary with the personality of the judge who happens to pass
upon any given case."'396 His "idiosyncratic biases"--for example, as to chil-
dren, women, corporations, and labor-are important factors in his deci-
sions.397 He thus presents the conundrum of the "fighting judge" '398 who
excoriates "government by judges,"399 the quintessential judicial activist who
advocates judicial restraint, or, in Justice Gunderson's terms, the "active-posi-
tive" who philosophically rejects those attributes.4°
Clark, however, lived in an era in which jurists who did not share his
social and political philosophy consistently struck down legislated "progres-
sive" reforms that he championed. Perhaps his philosophy would have dif-
386. Orth, supra note 383, at 712.
387. L. LLOYD, supra note 385, at 173.
388. Id. at 184.
389. G. WHITE, supra note 3, at 340.
390. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 457, 464 (1909).
391. Id. at 464.
392. See supra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
393. G. WHrrIE II, supra note 151, at 108.
394. Id at 128.
395. Id. at 129.
396. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 111 (1936).
397. G. WHITE II, supra note 151, at 123.
398. "Fighting Judge" is the subtitle of Brooks' biography of Clark, A. BRooics, supra note 1.
See text accompanying notes 74-77; the phrase recurs throughout the book in describing Clark.
399. This was the title of Clark's address to Cooper Union, New York City (Jan. 27, 1914),
contained in 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARY, supra note 8, at 572-94.
400. See Gunderson, Jurisprudential Character: The Typology oJames David Barber in a Ju-
dicial Context, 13 Sw. L. Rnv. 395, 423-24 (1983).
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fered had he lived when an activist judiciary, with equal consistency, created
reforms consonant with his beliefs.
In one of his many barbs aimed at Clark, Winston said that "[iln regard
to substantive law . . . he was not so strong";40' yet there is evidence that
Harvard Law School students were directed to read Clark's opinions as legal
classics.4°2 Winston also observes that the United States Supreme Court over-
ruled, more often than it affirmed, Clark's court, and he posits that Clark con-
sidered it an honor to be overruled in a "progressive" cause.403 Brooks,
however, somewhat conversely, describes Clark as having "great pride in the
tradition, good name, and fame of his Court."
4 4
If Clark expressed his thoughts in this regard, the present research has not
disclosed them. He perhaps best expressed, however, what he believed to be
the significance of his work as jurist as follows:
The work of all courts is in a large measure temporary; but there
is a still larger part which abides and shapes the future. Our civiliza-
tion is like the coral islands, built by individual and forgotten work-
ers, on whose labors each successive generation climbs to higher
things. The work of the courts is a potent factor in our civilization.
It bears the impress of the present, but remains to instruct the future,
as imprints of a passing shower of ages ago are preserved in strata of
sandstone. In like manner, much of the work shaped out by the con-
joined labor of bench and bar will have its effect long ages after the
men of this generation and all memory of them "Like thin streaks of
morning cloud shall have melted into the infinite azure of thepast.,,405
VIII. CONCLUSION
Over two years before Clark's death, E.C. Branson4O6 wrote to him:
I have a notion that we shall have to measure you according to
Emerson's formula, namely: "The great man is he who brings the
world around to his opinion twenty years later." You are one of the
men who in my opinion will be taller when he lies down to die than
he was when he stood up alive.4°7
Some, however, evaluated Clark while he lived. Branson himself, rather than
waiting twenty years post-mortem, wrote, less than a year before Clark's
401. Winston, supra note 15, at 184.
402. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 251.
403. Winston, Chief Justice Shepherd and his Times, 3 N.C.L. REv. 1, 12 (1925).
404. A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 159.
405. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 584-85 (from Clark's history of the
North Carolina Supreme Court).
406. Chairman of the Department of Rural Social Economics at the University of North Car-
olina, 1914-33, and editor of The University News Letter. 2 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK,
supra note 8, at 314.
407. Letter from E.C. Branson to Walter Clark (Mar. 23, 1921) (available in E.C. Branson
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Library,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina).
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death, that "no man whether he agrees or disagrees with you fails to recognize
you as a valiant servant of the common good, with the highest possible ideals
of civic righteousness, and with unflinching courage-a free, unterrified, un-
routable democrat of the sort that Emerson sang.
' '4°s
On the warm, partly cloudy day 409 on which Clark was buried, a promi-
nent railroad official told a friend at the funeral: "I have come to be sure that
Walter Clark is dead. I never attended a funeral with more pleasure." 410 An
editorial in a leading newspaper, however, stated:
[I]t is no exaggeration to say that no single man of his time exerted a
greater influence upon legislation, upon the legal profession and
upon the trend of court procedure. While he held opinions often
counter to those of the majority of his court and sometimes almost
startlingly contrary to the prevailing sentiment among a large portion
of the bar of the State, such opinions were respected and had their
influence upon the life of North Carolina.
4 11
Five months after his death, Clark was appraised as a
diligent student and affectionate son--the patriot who endured the
hardships and dangers of battle; partook of the privations of his de-
spoiled State, developed into the able advocate, wise counsellor,
skillful farmer, bold journalist, accurate author, accomplished lin-
guist, learned scientist, profound economist and jurist who with
knowledge judged righteously between men.412
The speaker, however, conceded that "[ilt remains to posterity to rightly ap-
praise the towering statute [sic] of his intellect. '413
There still was no consensus on Clark twenty years after his death.41
4
Winston, who shortly after Clark's death excoriated him as "that sociological,
politico-pragmatist," 415 still berated him. Brooks, in sharp contrast, apotheo-
sized him. Even the person who had referred to him as "a testy, temperish
man' '416 noted that "I think he wrote all the reasoned decisions of a forward-
looking nature that came up in his tenure of office."
417
408. Letter from E.C. Branson to Walter Clark (July 29, 1922) (available in E.C. Branson
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Library,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina). Governor Cameron Morrison wrote:
I want you [Clark] to let me say to you that I would rather have written into the Supreme
Court reports of this state the great principles of justice and right that you have written
than to have rendered any other service any other son of this state has ever given.
A. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 250. 0. Max Gardner, later Governor, wrote: "I think you have done
more to impress yourself upon the constructive forces of North Carolina than any other man who
ever lived in the state." Id.
409. The News and Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina), May 21, 1924, at 2, col. 1.
410. A. BRoOKS, supra note 1, at 141.
411. Charlotte Observer, May 20, 1924, at 8, col. 1.
412. Address by James A. Lockhart at Presentation of Walter Clark Portrait to North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, reported in 188 N.C. 839, 849 (1924).
413. Id. at 849.
414. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
415. Winston, supra note 403, at 11.
416. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
417. Diary of G. Hope Chamberlain, supra note 209, at 3.
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Four years later, A.B. Neil, Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme
Court, wrote:
Whether one agrees with Justice Clark's legal philosophy or rebels
against it, all must have a profound respect for his intellectual integ-
rity, his sincerity and his intense patriotism.
The Chief Justice was one of the great men of America, for-
ward-looking and courageous, ever the champion of the rights of the
underprivileged. As a jurist he had but one lofty ambition, which
was to honor the cause ofjustice. No nobler attribute could be found
as a motivating power in the life of any man. It was Ulpian who
defined justice as "the constant and perpetual will to allot to every
man his due." Dean Wigmore has said, "This is the noblest utter-
ance that is to be found in any of the world's great legal systems. '418
As this Article is written, over sixty years after his death, Clark still en-
genders controversy and eludes consensus. A law professor recently noted that
he always had heard him described as "the great Walter Clark. '4 19 A retired
judge, however, observed that Clark is often referred to as a disgrace to the
judiciary, and stated that residents of Clark's native county still are embar-
rassed keenly by him.
420
Clark himself, writing of another jurist, referred to "the cool impartial
award of history," and indicated that "[1]ike Cromwell, he would have said,
'Paint me as I am.' ",421 In light of the dispute that Clark still evokes, "the cool
impartial award of history" has not been rendered him; and a complete por-
trait of him, as he was, still may be unattainable.
Certain conclusions, however, can be drawn with confidence. Justice
Holmes stated that "as life is action and passion, it is required of a man that he
should share the passion and action of his time at peril of being judged not to
have lived."' 422 By this standard, Clark fully lived, for he shared fully in the
passion and action of his time, addressing eloquently and forcefully many of
its major issues. He influenced both the State and the nation during his life;
and through a substantial legacy of writings and recorded public utterances,
he has continued to speak in death.
If judged by Emerson's criterion-that those are great who bring the
world to their opinion twenty years later 423-- Clark clearly attained greatness.
Many of the reforms he encouraged were adopted long after his advocacy,
some long after his death, with his views influencing their adoption. He sub-
stantially influenced the common and statutory law of his jurisdiction relating
418. Neil, Book Review, 2 VAND. L. Rnv. 159, 161 (1948).
419. Conversation with Martin B. Louis, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill (Mar. 11, 1983).
420. Conversation with the Honorable Naomi E. Morris, Retired Chief Judge of the North
Carolina Court of Appeals (May 11, 1983).
421. 1 THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK, supra note 1, at 531 (from Clark's history of the North
Carolina Supreme Court).
422. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Memorial Day Address, 1884, quotedin J. BARTLETr, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 786 (14th ed. 1968).
423. See supra text accompanying notes 406-07.
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to women and children, making it more egalitarian and humane, and he
prompted beneficial legal reforms for laborers and prisoners. He was one of
the harbingers of sociological jurisprudence, and his judicial career foreshad-
owed certain essential tenets of legal realism. Clark thus presaged significant
aspects of twentieth century American jurisprudence.
Walter Clark was not included in G. Edward White's book, YheAmerican
Judicial Tradition.424 He contributed substantially, however, within his juris-
diction, and to some degree nationally, to the shaping of the law of his time
and beyond. He has continued to speak and influence policy from his grave
under the hemlock, demonstrating White's previously noted assertion that
"[flike ancient English forms of procedure, American judges can rule us from
their graves. '425 He is among those jurists who, notwithstanding exclusion
from the book, merit an enduring place in the American judicial tradition
itself.
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